

WORKING PAPER NO. 61

**AUSTRALIA'S
NATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK
A LOOK TO THE FUTURE**



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Australia's National Security Framework

A Look to the Future

Carl Oatley

Since World War Two, Australia has relied on the same high-level structures for its national security decision-making. However, the global environment is becoming increasingly complex, interdependent and multidimensional in terms of threats, actors and issues.

While the current structure appears adequate for the country's current needs, the fundamental questions on security now being posed by *Defence Review 2000* start with the issue of changing security in the international system. At the time of a new focus for strategic planning, this paper looks at the higher level structures that underpin a changing national position for Australia in the region and globally.

In the new paradigm, security is even less likely to be restricted to traditional interstate or regional tension, where armed forces and diplomacy approaches have been sufficient to solve security dilemmas. Empowered by the information revolution, corporations, minor political parties, pressure groups and individuals will increasingly demand security and be aware of their own insecurity. Threats will be diverse and may emerge from political, economic, social and environmental arenas or unexpected combinations of all factors.

A security structure that has limited openness, responsiveness and advice may not be adequately prepared to meet such consequences. This paper does not suggest the current national security decision-making system is failing, but that it can be improved to be more flexible, open and public. Reforms are needed to ensure all new issues can be dealt with by high-level decision-makers.

INTRODUCTION

Australians, to some extent, take national security for granted. The idea that our 'lucky country'¹ could be at risk from invasion or military action has remained at the back of people's minds, but it does not feature as a determinant in day-to-day life. There is a political dimension to the national security debate in Australia, but it is understated. We go about our lives confident that the government of the day has the wherewithal to protect the integrity of our national interests, national sovereignty and our lifestyles.

To this end, we have a small but capable defence force, a robust economy, a competitive commercial and trade sector, a relatively high awareness of our environment and a sense of our place in the region and the world. We also have an unsurpassed view of globalisation and ethno-nationalism. Australians are fast to take up new technologies and are keen to explore the rest of the world. We are also an increasingly diverse nation consisting of many ethnic backgrounds. These factors make us knowledgeable and vulnerable at the same time.

In a world where international relations theorists seek to understand more complex issues such as disrupted states, refugees/illegal immigration, environment, economics, globalisation, social forces, human rights, and ethno-nationalism, questions are now being asked about what Australia's interests are. Our own *Defence Review 2000* heads its discussion by posing such questions.²

Australia's national security structure has changed little since the end of World War Two. The Cabinet and committees' structure is now over fifty years old, and while it has coped adequately with a relatively simple threat environment focused on foreign affairs and defence issues, it takes little account of many of the recognised modern issues in security deliberations.

This paper seeks to develop alternative systems to better engage the wider perspective of security evident in the world today. In doing so, it briefly looks at the present structure and seeks to identify the aim of Australia's national security policy. It also seeks to outline the limitations of our current national security structure, how it can be made more effective, and what new structures will support the government decision-makers in making it more effective. The generally low level of community interest in national security

policy also needs to be addressed. This is an issue its own right and needs to be pro-actively brought further into the public arena before the issues themselves attract attention and necessitate a reactive response.³

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

*National security involves much more than military defence. At a minimum, it is fundamentally about the survival of society. Pushing the definition a little further, it is concerned with the creation of the necessary political, economic, social, and environmental conditions within which a society might flourish.*⁴

Most appraisals of Australian purpose, interests and security have been expressed in strategic or military terms. The aim of this section is to examine the concepts underpinning, and identify the main players in the current management of Australia's security and determine if there is a problem. Australians have had, in the past, a limited view of the notion of security and need to broaden this outlook.

This paper will look at the broad concept of security, but will not move to a totally idealist model. The argument is premised on a desire to give context to the specific defence and foreign affairs issues arising from within the strategic studies field, while not descending into a theoretical debate.⁵

Australia's approach to national security is not clearly defined. Australia does, however, successfully undertake some of the theoretical thought processes and analysis underpinning national security policy. This country has had a long and evolutionary approach to defence and strategic planning, and with the publication of the first white paper on Australia's foreign and trade policy, our interests in foreign policy are well articulated.⁶ We are one of the few countries to openly outline our national interests and perspective, and the positive acceptance of the paper augurs well for more open analysis of other aspects of national security policy.

A DEFINITION

*An Australian security policy must perforce reflect the needs and aspirations of the Australian people, and maintain the fundamental principles upon which the Australian society is founded.*⁷

In addressing Australia's security interests, the recent DFAT White Paper reflects what is largely a strategic mindset:

Australia's security interests go well beyond the physical protection of Australian territory. For the foreseeable future, Australia is not likely to face the direct use of armed force against it. The security of Australia, however, requires more than safety from attack. For Australia, security also means preserving the capacity for independent decision-making thereby ensuring it can pursue national objectives without internal coercion. More broadly Australia's national security and its economic interests are inextricably linked to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region.

It goes on to discuss non-military threats, stating that:

Over the next fifteen years it is likely that even more attention will be paid to the so-called non-military threats such as pandemics, illegal immigration, refugee flows, environmental degradation, narcotics and transnational crime.

This broader concept of national security is gaining momentum but the *interests*-based style of security will only be slowly drawn into recognising it.¹⁰ It relies largely on a continuum of policy development and review that may not be forthcoming. This approach is also a realist-based approach, where the nation-state is the principal focus for policy development.¹¹ It takes no account of the *issues*-based approach to national security where people:

face functional dangers to their collective and singular well being. Such dangers include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, ethnic and tribal conflicts, global climate change, the asymmetrical effects of a globalised economy, and the like.¹²

In regard to National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) deliberations, there was a deliberate decision made not to further define national security so the scope of discussion could be left as wide as possible.¹³

AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST

*'National interest' is a singularly vague concept.*¹⁴

National interest is, by definition, a realist construct. Its history is only as long as the history of modern states and the term has been extensively used by United States statesmen and theorists.¹⁵ Most importantly, in Australia's case, it is a useful concept to argue our uniqueness even among western liberal states. It should also be noted that the concept of national interest may be waning or of limited use in western pluralist societies. As Joseph Frankel argues: 'on the one hand a unitary national interest strikes us as inappropriate for our pluralist societies; on the other it clashes with global ideas.'¹⁶

Australia, like most countries, has historically seen its national interest in defence, economic, political or ideological terms. This is perpetuated by the recent DFAT White Paper, which claims to reflect:

the importance the Government attaches to informing the Australian Parliament and the Australian people of the policies, priorities and strategies that underpin the Government the government's approach to foreign affairs and trade.¹⁷

The publication does achieve what many other nations have never attempted: it lays a theoretical foundation for what Australia's foreign and trade policies seek to achieve for Australians. It is a broad and ambitious agenda that is open to criticism, comparison and competition. Despite this, not only does it lose nothing by its openness, it does not limit itself to the use of restricted categories of national security analysis. It uses both *interests*-based concepts and it also addresses foreign and national problems on an *issues* basis. The DFAT White Paper is an important document that can lay the basis for further development of broader national security analysis and reform.

AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

*Military threats are not the only threats to security.*¹⁸

While Australia has a broadly-stated national interest document, its national security policy decisions are based on a departmental diarchy of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Both departments produce regular high-level policy documents such as white papers and strategic policy documents. However, there is no overarching national security policy document produced with broad government, departmental, parliamentary and private input that serves as a national security policy. Ablong agrees: 'currently, Australia has no clearly defined national security policy ... there are no fundamental linkages between foreign and defence policy, nor the other government tools available.'¹⁹

Australia does not, therefore, have a formal or broadly recognised 'security policy'. It has 'national interests', 'foreign affairs and trade policy', and a 'security strategy' (DFAT White Paper), defence policy (Defence White Paper), and Defence's 'Strategic Policy', but even the rhetoric has not recognised security in a broad sense and talked of a 'security policy'. Australia's national security policy documents are, therefore, a

combination of the DFAT White Paper (1998), the last Defence White Paper (1994), and the Defence Department's *Australia's Strategic Policy* (1997) and regular classified drafts and reviews of the above. Our diplomacy follows a 'good citizen' approach and our strategic (defence) stance is defensive. Our economic, social and environmental interests are not addressed in great detail within these documents, as our policy makers see security within the terms of national power underscored by diplomacy and military strength. This is a dangerously limited and, as Buzan suggests, an underdeveloped way of thinking about security.²⁰ The key security issues in the next millennium 'are likely to be non-military rather than military ones – such as population movements, pandemics and trans-boundary environmental issues',²¹ and recent ADF tasks, with the military being used in non-military roles, would seem to support this trend.

Most national security policies have been guided by the incumbent government of the day. Australia is no exception. While foreign policy and, to some extent, Defence policy should be pre-eminent concerns of the national government; this is not necessarily the case in the Australian context. There is relatively little politicking on foreign policy concerns compared to domestic economic matters. Governments in recent times have rarely called for mandates over foreign policy issues. In particular, Australia faces significant limitations in exercising foreign policy. Geographically isolated, not belonging to a discernible trading bloc and with limited power, Australians are sensitive to that 'nebulous thing called "world opinion"'.²² Nonetheless, in accordance with the principles of the constitution and despite seemingly apathetic electoral interest, national security must remain a primary concern of government. In this context, the foreign and defence policies are the clearest statements in this regard.

Australia's foreign policy has three main objectives. These are:

- to defend Australian sovereignty and political independence;
- to secure a free and liberal international trading regime;
- to be a 'good international citizen'.²³

In the recent DFAT White Paper it is literally more self-willed:

it is about the hard-headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy: the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian People. In all that it does in the field of foreign and trade policy, the government will apply this basic test of national interest.²⁴

In defence terms, national security is based on an implied national interest in maintaining sovereignty; thus encompassing the military concerns of integrity of territory, seas, the economic exclusive zone and Australia's economic well-being. Military problems are identified and addressed through our strategic policy. The problems relate to Australia's vastness, resources, surveillance, operational tasks, and border maintenance. These issues are dealt with by our strategic policy but are not part of broader deliberation in a long term planning basis. As Marc Ablong has observed:

Undertaking the task of providing security for Australia is, in essence, a far larger and more encompassing task than providing for the military defence of Australia. Threats to Australia, its people and interests can no longer be defined²⁵ only within the military contingency continuum.

Indeed, it is a continuum, and that is part of the problem. This paper will take Ablong's noteworthy enunciation a step further by proposing a holistic approach to national security planning.

In pursuit of the above objectives, both major political parties generally agree that Australia should:

- support the Commonwealth of Nations,
- support the UN and its charter,
- strengthen and expand regional relationships,
- continue to maintain relationships with our friends and allies,
- maintain the ANZUS treaty, and
- provide assistance and cooperation with less developed nations particularly in our region.

Since World War Two the US alliance has occupied the pre-eminent position in foreign policy considerations, as Nancy Viviani has observed:

The US alliance became the major preoccupation in the departmental establishment. The Washington Embassy became our most powerful and sought-after post. The nurturing of the US intelligence connections became a central consideration the Defence Department, the Office of National Assessments as well as the Department of Foreign Affairs.²⁶

In more recent times the actors on the Australian foreign policy scene have become more varied, informed and possibly more virulent. Previously Australia, and the people influencing foreign policy, had an attachment to the status quo, which partially reflected Australia's remoteness, vested economic interests and public apathy.²⁷ Camilleri believes that 'the paucity of communication between the informed minority and the decision-makers conspired to create throughout the greater part of the 1950s and 1960s a situation of critical immobility in the conduct of Australia's external relations'.²⁸

The major actors in foreign policy of the past also tend to be seen in macro-conceptualisations: Evatt the internationalist; Casey, extending the concept of ties with the American alliance, and Calwell, holding onto the White Australia policy. None, of course, are that simple. The difference in the contemporary national security policy arena is the increased variety of actors with an interest in the direction of policy. From the Prime Minister to special interest lobby groups there are many influences on Australian national security policy today. The influences are strong and often immediate. Policy decisions are often changed in one day.

BROADER SECURITY ISSUES

The broader issues examined below are as fundamental to national security as military defence. While they may not attract or require the resources and spending needed to maintain a modern defence force, it is vital that they be considered as part of Australia's security outlook. Despite being focused on the defence debate alone, even Defence Review 2000 admits that 'long term trends in international affairs are making wars less likely', an acknowledgment that the character of the international system is undergoing fundamental changes.

Disrupted States²⁹

Extensive grounds for conflict exist between natural nations and the attempts of governments to create nations which coincide with state boundaries.³⁰

The problem of disrupted states highlights issues in national security policymaking and intelligence assessment that are critical to efficient security structures. Because states are disintegrating and reforming, the issue of disrupted states goes beyond individual countries. Disrupted states bring broad

security issues such as ethics, health, humanitarian law and peace enforcement training into focus. Governments need to realise that crises involving disrupted states have wider and more complex agendas than the former, relatively simple, post-colonial independence movements and management of such crises spans national, regional, global and UN responsibilities. Planning for action in disrupted states includes coordinating organisations, such as non-government organisations (NGOs), business, civilian police and the military.

Transnational Crime

*What then is at risk from criminal threat? It is no less than the security of Australia itself and the health and welfare of all Australians.*³¹

The level of threat from transnational crime is predicted to increase into the next century as criminal organisations increasingly exploit the information revolution and globalisation factors, to thwart national and state jurisdictions and areas of law enforcement operations.³² The relevance of this issue has been well explained by Alan Dupont and other analysts.³³ Briefly, the issues of globalisation and the information revolution blur distinctions between states assisting organised criminal operations, making them a factor in undermining good governance and subverting the whole nature of the global state security order.

Refugees and Illegal Immigration

*Australia is paying a real price for being known as a country which welcomes immigrants and has an unequalled reputation in settling refugees.*³⁴

Australia's national security structure must be able to analyse long-term trends in this area and coordinate appropriate policy and practical measures. Given the growth of the world's population,³⁵ the trend analyses conducted over the last decade,³⁶ and the recent influx of illegal immigrants to Australian territory, this is an issue that will become of increasing global importance.³⁷

Human Rights

*The government views human rights as an inseparable part of Australia's overall foreign policy approach.*³⁸

Human rights are recognised by government as vital to national and regional security, as reflected in this statement by former Human Rights Commissioner Brian Burdekin:

I think our security in this region is dependent on the stability of the region, and I very strongly believe that the stability of the region, in turn, is dependent on the extent to which governments in particular do or do not observe fundamental human rights.³⁹

While rhetoric is heavy in this area, the input of human rights expertise at the higher levels of the security structure is largely confined to DFAT and Attorney-General's Departments. The Joint Standing Committee reports on the issues but has no direct contact with the structure outside parliamentary rapport. A National Committee on International Humanitarian Law under the aegis of the Australian Red Cross operates with the desire to:

work closely with relevant government departments, the Australian Defence Force and Divisional IHL Committees to ensure fulfilment of Australia's international obligations under IHL and assist the development of government policy on IHL.⁴⁰

Human rights are also recognised by the government as important to security and Australia's national interest:

The Government believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is important to Australia's national interests not least because it underpins Australia's broader security and economic interests. These interests are inextricably linked to the stability and economic prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. Therefore, the Government attaches a particular importance to the promotion and protection of human rights in the region as an inseparable part of Australia's overall foreign policy approach.⁴¹

This approach will increasingly be part of a global recognition of human rights as a basis for security action.

Environment

*Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.*⁴²

Many would argue that the environment is the focal point for a reconceptualised view of security. The environment is shaping as one of the major arenas for security management. It is a global transnational issue and also potential state on state issue in the event of conflict. Australia has tentatively grasped this issue as one of concern, but has not fully developed a strong policy approach. With a land mass of 7,692,030 square

kilometres, a coastline of 59,740 kilometres, and an AFZ of 8.9 million square kilometres, Australia has one of the largest physical areas on the globe to protect.⁴³ Responsibility on this issue exists in a both a national and a global sense.

In a national sense, Australia has a responsibility to its citizens to protect the environment and maintain long-term living standards. On a global level, we have a responsibility to protect a large proportion of the world surface from environmental degradation. Australia's security policy and structure must therefore consider environmental issues as a high order security item that needs to be considered in its own right by the highest levels of government.

Economics and Globalisation

*The two most profound influences on Australian foreign and trade policy over the next fifteen years will be globalisation, and the continuing economic rise of East Asia.*⁴⁴

An awareness of the myths and realities of globalisation is one of the keys to national security decision-making. It is a term that is not well understood but it influences individuals, companies, groups and governments in state and utopian structures. Various possible futures from nihilistic dystopia to democratic utopia have been envisaged.⁴⁵ Given the economic base of much globalisation factors, the Asian financial crisis drove many to a more pessimistic prognosis for the future. This trend of pessimism feeds an industry of 'futurists' that rely on the instability of predictions to retain their influence. The forces of globalisation therefore need to be understood when looking at both the immediate and long-term national security framework in this country.

Technology

*Our ability to use and manage information technology will be one of the areas where we can maintain and aspire to continuing excellence.*⁴⁶

While always a factor in modern times, the importance of technology to national security is increasing. It has immediate economic, social, environmental and military relevance and thus spans the broad spectrum of security issues. Australia is increasingly reliant on information technology and the knowledge edge that is designed to give the nation a strategic and economic efficiency advantage.⁴⁷ The same technology that gives us this advantage, makes us vulnerable. The fragility

of national power reliant on high technology is aptly demonstrated by the concerns over the 'Y2K bug' and 'cybercrime'.⁴⁸ The allocation of resources to research and development, the education of the population, the organisation of research and the utilisation of technology are crucial underpinnings of national power. The critical issue is that technology and science are major platforms of national power and interest and, therefore, security.

National Infrastructure Protection

*The core problem confronting policy makers regarding the risks Australia faces is that no single authority is responsible for protecting Australia's national infrastructure.*⁴⁹

Recent developments in technology and increasing privatisation have re-emphasised the issues involved in protecting vital national infrastructure. By its very nature of detailed, automatic control, technology has become a part of this physical structure and has increased the vulnerability of such assets.⁵⁰ The government and bureaucracy have recognised this issue and have set up groups to manage the problem, assess the threat, report incidents, and recommend response options. The Australian Labor Party has also recognised this and included measures to address it in their current policy document.⁵¹ The protective mechanisms exist but are relatively meagre compared to the assets assigned, for example, by the USA who have a Presidential Commission and Directives plus significant resources and a whole of government approach to this issue.

Social Forces

She'll be right mate.

In the new security paradigm, the social cohesion of the nation-state should not be forgotten as a national security issue. The current government seeks 'to strengthen the country socially by recognising that it [is] important to draw upon the fundamental values and instincts of the Australian community.'⁵² Social analysis and commentary also need to be part of the national security deliberations. Even if other factors such as economic conditions are good, social coherence and well-being should not be taken for granted.

Ignorance of the domestic social cohesion of the nation could recreate problems such as the societal conflicts that arose from the Vietnam War, and the more recent

concerns of unemployment, illegal immigrants and ballooning executive salaries. All of these issues are indicators of developing social forces that may lead to social division, and therefore should be addressed in a national security context.

Broader Security Issues – Overview

Reviews of Australian security and defence consistently admit that Australia is unlikely to be subjected to direct military attack. Australians are, however, concerned about the broader issues discussed above. They are concerned because these issues relate to their welfare and security in both a direct and indirect sense. Statistical and anecdotal reporting puts the environment, the economy, social welfare, crime and technology as high interest areas for Australians. From both a topical and security point of view these issues need and deserve more attention at the national level than they have previously enjoyed. Expertise needs to be drawn from the currently 'stovepiped' departmental and lobbyist organisations structures and enmeshed into a security apparatus that accounts for all these broader issues.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM – IS THERE A PROBLEM?

*To decide how best to provide for security for Australia is a serious matter for any government and the advice that governments receive needs the support of many types of professionalism. It involves the separate technical knowledge, judgement and interests of the sailor, soldier, the airman, in all their different specialisations, the scientist, the financial administrator, the systems analyst, the engineer, the intelligence analyst, the diplomat, the production planner and manager, the computer programmer, industry adviser, cost accountant, the academic analyst and – not least for being mentioned last – the citizen who looks to government to provide him and the nation with security, and who pays for it all.*⁵³

Structure

The Commonwealth Government has constitutional responsibility for 'peace, order and good government' and defence and external affairs under Section 51 of the Constitution and, under Section 119, 'shall protect every state against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence'.⁵⁴ While policy and technology have changed dramatically in the last ninety-nine years, the basic structural decision-making process governing

Australia's national security has not significantly changed in the last generation. The structure is designed principally to advise an executive, embodied principally in Cabinet, to exercise power for the national interest and, arguably, for the global 'human' interest. The Defence Department has a strong interest in national security policy and the CDF and Secretary both recently recognised that the 'processes used to make high-level Defence decisions are not understood and are deficient' and that "'tribalism" and cultural differences are being allowed to get in the way of good decision-making'.⁵⁵ If this is the case in Defence, then similarly problematic leadership and structural challenges may face other departments.

As for the higher organisation itself, the prime political body is still the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) supported by the Secretaries' Committee on National Security (SCNS). These bodies are themselves supported by other inter-departmental committees such as the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).⁵⁶

The function of the NSC is to 'deal with national security issues, including strategic developments and issues of long-term relevance to Australia's economic, political, trade and defence interests, and the oversight of Australia's intelligence and security agencies'.⁵⁷ The NSC considers the Cabinet submissions and Memorandums related to these issues. The submissions are usually filtered through the SCNS and the SCNS also deals with other papers as required. The SPCG discusses the current issues related to strategy but does not consider formal papers.

The SCNS and the SPCG are both inter-departmental committees forming part of a 'non-systematic process ... that illustrates the extent to which the executive continues to dominate the process [of Australian decision-making]'.⁵⁸ Knight and Hudson believe the decision-making process is non-systematic mainly due to its historical nature. In addition, the main departments involved — Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence have tended to dominate the issues related to global, regional and military affairs. Australia did not develop, as did the USA in 1947, a focal body such as the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council. There is, therefore, only the part-time, and as required, NSC, supported by regular SCNS and SPCG meetings that are designed to coordinate the security advice. No dedicated, full time institution exists to deal with the national security environment.

While the rhetoric may suggest otherwise, the NSC does not generate and initiate policy but makes decisions as advised by the bureaucracy and is usually reactive to national security crises. It does not oversee the disbursement of all resources related to national security as it does not have a whole of government approach to policymaking and does not have direct input into the budgetary process.

There are other committees with indirect input into the process. There remains a Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT) that has sat since 1952 (see above), but its reports are generally reactive or topical. It has been critical of government but, as a product of the Westminster system, is under some pressure to conform to party and historical pressures. There are few examples of other institutions outside academia considering the broader structural nature of decision-making.

The high level structure rarely comes under direct criticism due to its inherent insularity and a lack of parliamentary accountability. In major foreign affairs and defence matters electoral pressure is also low and the interest and experience from parliamentary representatives is limited. In addition, the layers of national security classification, party and cabinet solidarity, make looking inside the national security system a time consuming and difficult, if not illegal, task.⁵⁹

Interestingly, the current federal opposition party has a policy for changing the structure: 'Strengthening National Security'.⁶⁰ The Australian Labor Party policy seeks to expand the role of the NSC, specifically address the protection of critical civil infrastructure and set up National Security Coordinating Groups to undertake tasks for the NSC for assessments and auditing of expanded roles. In addition, a recent dissenting report by four Labor members of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended that 'no binding action should be taken to extend the Pine Gap agreement unless the Government either provided the Treaties Committee with adequate information or set up a new parliamentary national security committee to deal with security and intelligence issues'.⁶¹ The most cogent arguments to support this are a comparison with US congressional access to similar information and the ubiquitous rhetoric promising transparency and openness that appears to be followed by limited evolutionary action.

Resources

While there is an unstated intention for the national resources of government to be used for all elements of national security, there is little understanding of how this is managed outside the departmental budgetary processes. For example, while around \$A11 billion is now spent on Defence each year there is little analysis of how much is spent on broader national security work and agencies from other sources and departments such as those listed at Appendix E. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) breakdown of Australian Government outlays separates defence (FY96–7, \$9454m) and public order and safety (FY96–7, \$7406m), but it would be very difficult to break down further outlays to quantify the funding of national security related agencies such as those listed at Appendix E.⁶² Most current information is broken down into separate departmental portfolio budget statements, thus entrenching control within the existing bureaucratic structure.

There appears to be no dedicated study of national security outlays in the broadest sense: this is one area where a National Security Council or similar body could sponsor or initiate a study aimed at providing information on just how all national resources in regard to security are managed or should be managed. The government and its advisory bodies would then be better placed to make decisions on national security priorities in the widest context.

INFLUENCES AND ACTORS ON THE STRUCTURE

Numerous actors, interests and issues influence the national security structure. A brief survey of these factors is required to understand the broad perspective the national decision-making process needs to embrace.

The Executive: The Prime Minister and Senior Ministers

*The distinguishing feature of the British Parliamentary tradition is that the legislature is dominated by the executive branch.*⁶³

In recent times, the Prime Minister has been the principal director of national policy.⁶⁴ Aside from the Prime Minister, it is the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to control and direct foreign policy. While Gareth Evans as Foreign Minister in the former Labor government believed he witnessed a ‘watershed’ in our

foreign policy, those changes not only reflected the international agenda but the increasing effect of economic pressures and interest groups on the scene. The Foreign Minister must absorb on behalf of the government the pressure brought to bear by the media, other governments, ethnic groups, parliament, the opposition, other pressure/interest groups and the prognostications of academics and other commentators. All this must be dealt with in what Viviani calls ‘the bureaucratic context’ and cannot be removed from what Hugh Smith has described as ‘the debate and contention of domestic policies’.⁶⁵

As Smith suggests, the bureaucratic organisations were the only ones considered capable of coping with all this input of information. As a consequence, many of the minor decisions of foreign policy tend to escape any further processing outside departmental decisions ratified, if necessary, by the Minister. Routine or conventional diplomatic and trade questions may not even attract appropriate Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) attention. In contrast, ministers and senior government officials often are compelled to make major controversial decisions in the midst of a crisis, highlighting the reactive nature of foreign policy. Yet DFAT has developed ‘a consonance in broad foreign and trade policies’ and has, according to Viviani, ‘raised its standing in the bureaucratic batting order’.⁶⁶

The Department of Defence exists under much the same conditions. It does, however, have a long history of strategic review that gives it a very sound rationalist basis for its influence.

The other facet of the executive which makes it pre-eminent in foreign policy decision-making is its dominance over both federal and state legislatures. In the Australian context, an interesting phenomenon has been the moves by the Federal Government to override the states in several legal cases (eg the Koowarta and Dams cases). International treaty obligations have also been used as factors in disputes. These disputes also have constitutional ramifications.⁶⁷

While Cabinet plans how the country will be run, it relies on advice from ministers and departments to do so. Cabinet is essentially an informal body and is not mentioned in the constitution.⁶⁸ It evolves with and reflects emphases in policy. The executive embodied in the Cabinet is a ‘board of directors’ style of running government which, in its nascence, relied ‘upon such

twentieth century phenomena as electronic communications equipment and large support staffs (for both professional purposes such as planning and clerical work)'.⁶⁹ The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) is the Standing Committee that oversees planning related to defence and security issues.⁷⁰ Cabinet relies almost totally on departmental submissions and memoranda for its considerations. The only other way to gain cabinet consideration is through an 'under the line' request to the Prime Minister.⁷¹ This entrenches the power and information flow in very few hands. Defence and foreign policy are particular 'in-house' issues.⁷²

While Australia continues to rely on Cabinet and its standing committees for decision-making, the government no longer has the mortgage on all the information the new century is offering. For much of this century, government had exclusive control over most security-related information in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and, to some extent, the economy. As globalisation trends overwhelm economic activity, an increasingly educated public are recognising the importance of other security issues such as the economy, social justice and the environment. In this context, the relevance of a total and continually closed decision-making structure needs to be reviewed.

Parliament

*The simple trouble is that members sublimate their own opinions to the wishes of the party, and this is not good for Parliament.*⁷³

The Australian Parliament conforms broadly to a Westminster Model that gives it the power to:

- discuss, amend and pass legislation;
- authorise the supply of money to for the conduct of government;
- question, publicise and investigate the action of government and the needs of the community, and
- provide, test and, in some cases, replace leaders and governments.⁷⁴

Despite the above, there is only negligible requirement to ratify or endorse foreign policy initiatives in the Parliament. While there are party⁷⁵ and joint committee⁷⁶ avenues used to influence or recommend courses of action, major decisions tend to be made in Cabinet. This is particularly so when broad

coordination is required from several departments. There is little incentive for routine debate on foreign policy issues in parliament. Question time provides one of the few brief interludes where crises can be debated in a timely fashion. Defence issues 'in particular have become frequent in recent years'⁷⁷ but in the late 1990s these have often focused on personnel or major equipment problems rather than strategic considerations.

The committee system has an enviable power to investigate issues, but it is difficult to quantify any evidence of committee influence in the ensuing policies. The influence of the committees is achieved through public reporting and the lobbying of individual members to their party or peers. Committees seem most effective when they are specifically tasked to review finances. As this applies to foreign policy and defence as well as other departments, some high price projects can be altered on committee's recommendations. In addition, some governments, in an indirect sense, could have been accused of stifling debate on some issues by using so called 'outside' advisers to advise on policy initiatives or to lay down the groundwork for a change in policy.

On the other hand, there are notable occasions where outside advisers have generated debate where it was previously lacking (the Dibb and Garnaut reports immediately come to mind) or have provided specific advice where departmental resources were lacking. In general, however, the committee system and Parliament are often reactive and recommendations rarely proceed without the endorsement of the executive. Debates on foreign policy are often restricted to crisis or topical issues and long term planning or structural reform is often restricted to election policy statements. Parliamentary scrutiny through its committee system remains a part-time practice, and its effect on the national security structure and decision-making is still very limited.

The Bureaucracy

*Where everything is done through a bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all.*⁷⁸

Arguably, the most important influence on decision-making is the bureaucracy set up specifically to support government policy. The bureaucracy controls and provides tasked policy options and intelligence advice that is supplied to ministers and controls the machinery

that puts decisions into effect. In this sense, the bureaucracy holds a privileged mantle of influence.

The Departments. The breakdown of Commonwealth departments broadly follows the specific functions listed under Section 51 of the Constitution. The bureaucratic structure is therefore roughly tied to paradigms set at the end of the late 1800s. This becomes problematic when dealing with issues that have arisen in recent years. For example, there is no specific mention of ‘security’ or ‘national security’ in the Australian Constitution, nor had the concept been thought of outside imperial defence and diplomatic terms.

The departments hold a virtual monopoly on the provision of timely, quality advice and services to ministers. At the same time, there is a strong requirement for accountability in performance and outcome-based approaches, and this is reflected in an increasing adoption of private industry concepts. However, this is not necessarily producing more openness or accountability. Nor is it necessarily resulting in increased information sharing and production. In the short term, it appears to be limiting the context for government decision-making by outsourcing the tasks and the risks. There is little cognisance of how each practice will contribute to the national good or to national security.

‘The new face of defence values economic efficiency as much as military prowess’ but on what rationale is this based? If economic efficiency is recognised as a contributing factor to national security this may be a valid point, but who has determined this and how? Some of the new practices we are adopting in the bureaucracy may be assisting national security, but it is a piecemeal approach based principally on economic efficiency factors.

The bureaucracy span of interest in national security is wide and complex (see Appendix E). There is increasing rhetoric about involving all departments in a ‘whole of government’ approach to security but little change in the range and number of agencies and departments involved in national security deliberations has occurred.

Departmental Committees. The bureaucracy relies largely on committees to provide advice and guidance

on the conduct of national security business. The committee system within various departments has proved, over time, to be a reasonable means of drawing together advice from within the bureaucracy, but they rarely have wider community input and have limited decision-making ability. In 1987, according to the Cross Report, there were ninety committees ‘operating at various levels’ in Defence alone.⁷⁹ The sheer quantity and departmental focus of these committees has led to ‘institutional intransigence’⁸⁰ that would take considerable time and reform to overcome.⁸¹ The main reforms for national security proposed in this paper will rely on looking at committees and agencies at the highest levels.

Secretaries’ Committee on National Security (SCNS).⁸² The SCNS is the main interface between the bureaucracy and the NSC. It provides a senior bureaucratic level of endorsement for NSC submissions and acts as a coordinating body for strategic and intelligence information collection and dissemination. Much of the SCNS work is effectively done out of session or could be delegated to other committees. Critical crisis management issues tend to be pushed up to the NSC for action or endorsement. Thus, the NSC is often forced to act as a crisis management body rather than a decision-making authority. The current framework has led to a tendency to over-manage defence and foreign policy crisis and operational matters and a continuing marginalisation of broader security issues.

Intelligence and Intelligence Agencies. While technically subservient to the bureaucratic departmental structure, the importance of national intelligence agencies to the national security structure is unarguable. The Australian intelligence agencies closely follow the British model in their style, powers and tasking arrangements. Unlike the US, there is no national intelligence ‘supremo’ such as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),⁸³ but intelligence is passed through the departmental structure to various interdepartmental committees at different levels. At the highest level, the Heads of Intelligence Agencies Meeting (HIAM) coordinates and prioritises the work of the officially recognised agencies (see below).

Intelligence support to government in Australia has pursued a path of evolutionary change and improvement. This has been due to recognition, in strategic planning documents, of its relative

importance, and its relations with its UK and USA partners and their global connections. As the national security structure faces the new security paradigm, intelligence also faces the new paradigm of the information age and the deluge of open source information/intelligence.⁸⁴ Classified information is less and less likely to provide decision-makers with exclusive data and analysis for immediate action. There is little doubt that, in the future, intelligence agencies will retain a role managing discreetly-sourced information but they must also embrace the fact that everyone will have greater access to information, and

the influences on decision-makers will be concomitant.⁸⁵ In order to retain their relevance for a future national security structure, intelligence organisations and professionals will need to combine their current roles as information coordinators and repositories with an intellectual role in looking at new threat sources and analysing radical change.⁸⁶

It is important to note that the national intelligence and security agencies are currently linked to departments as shown in the following table:

Major agencies of the Australian Intelligence Community (Official Description)	
Office of National Assessments (ONA)	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)*	Department of Defence
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)	Department of Defence
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)	Attorney-General's Department
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
*Internal defence intelligence agencies also include Defence Security Branch, Australian Imagery Organisation and the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre.	
Other 'Security' Agencies (Author's description)	
Australian Federal Police (AFP)	Justice (Attorney-General's Department)
Australian Customs Service (ACS)(incl. Coastwatch)	Justice (Attorney-General's Department)
National Crime Authority (NCA)	Justice (Attorney-General's Department)
AUSTRAC	Justice (Attorney-General's Department)
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS)	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Table1. Linkages between national intelligence and security agencies and Commonwealth departments.

The intelligence agencies are an important part of the bureaucratic structure but their input to strategic issues is not at question. They have undergone significant reform since the end of the cold war and have improved efficiency and focused tasking. This is despite a tendency to resist change, '[which] is perhaps a characteristic of highly disciplined and structured organisations such as intelligence and security agencies'.⁸⁷ The intelligence agencies' tasking could be expanded to newer areas of security concern but their place in the current or a new structure is assured.

Changes of Government/The Opposition/Minor Parties

*There is [no recognition] for the Opposition as Opposition; it has no allocation of parliamentary time, an important resource.*⁸⁸

Opposition parties tend to have a difficult time influencing policy. The inherent problem of being removed from the bureaucracy and the international contacts that are part of government make it hard for the opposition to be timely or accurate when criticising national security policy decision making. There has been significant bipartisanship in many areas, although this has tended to decrease in recent times. As Alan Behm has commented, 'there is also a substantial continuity of foreign policy between governments of different political persuasions.'⁸⁹ At least one historical example exists of the opposition being made part of the decision-making process in the Advisory War Council during World War Two.⁹⁰

The current opposition has flagged elements of the national security policy that need new emphasis. This was part of their policy at the last election and remains unaltered at this time.⁹¹ The main emphasis of this policy is the acknowledgment of the vulnerability of national infrastructure to national security and recognition of the need to take into account non-traditional elements of security.

Minor parties, such as the Australian Democrats, have not been able to devote significant resources to defence policy development, as their resources are limited.⁹² As seen in the Parliamentary Committees, there may be a good case for more involvement of minor parties in national security planning, as they are not bound by the need for consensus required of being part of the ruling party.

Political Parties

*Party organizations perform multiple roles, of which the implementation of the policies and protection of the interests of the party membership through parliamentary action is one . . . to win votes for a particular point of view and the candidates that represent it [is another].*⁹³

When elected, political parties clearly have an influence on national security policy decisions. Interestingly, the more radical, impractical or rabidly dogmatic ideas tend to be ameliorated once a party comes to office. Some become clearly impractical, while others threaten to alienate the various coalitions of interests that all major political parties need in order to sustain electoral support. Party links could be used to beneficial effect if the national security decision-making process were made more inclusive. Business, unions and rural representatives could all usefully become part of the process. These representatives would need to divest themselves of party links but their advice and input into security decision-making could be invaluable.

Interest/Pressure Groups

*We define a pressure group as any association that makes a claim, either directly or indirectly, on the government, so as to influence the making or administering of public policy without itself being willing to exercise the formal powers of government.*⁹⁴

The last twenty years has seen a remarkable growth in interest groups that seek to influence government policy. By their nature, economic groups are prominent in the area of foreign policy. Tariffs, licences, customs, shipping etc. are important issues for international economic and business concerns and directly affect the nation's economic prosperity. Other groups have more specialised concerns. Ethnic groups tend to focus on the bilateral relations of Australia and their former homeland. Liberal and non-government care organisations are more interested in humanitarian concerns on an international scale. All of these groups use varying methods to influence government and, for that matter, opposition national security policy. These methods range from informal contact, to the use of professional lobbyists, public meetings or demonstrations. Their impact is another matter. It does appear that a characteristic of this influence is that crisis decisions are clearly less vulnerable to pressure group

influence. Pressure groups continue to face a variety of obstacles: no single point of access (despite centralisation in Canberra), public apathy, timeliness of action, and the lack of electoral incentive for decision-makers to take heed of their opinions. Thus, despite a growing interest in international economic issues, their influence would appear to remain slight in the medium term. Future involvement of authorised representatives from outside government in the continuing policymaking process would reduce groups' emotive influence when issues are only topical. They need to be brought into longer-term national security deliberations.

The Electorate and the People

It can be argued that public opinion sets outer limits beyond which no party will go if it wishes to gain or retain office.⁹⁵

Most recent Australian governments have been concerned to reassure the people of their competent and pragmatic approach to foreign policy. As few people make foreign policy the main factor in their voting decision, government policy in this area tends to be uncontroversial. The public interest in humanitarian areas is reflected in, for example, Senator Evans's 'good citizen' approach. Both major parties, government and electorate get a 'warm inner glow' from this facet of national security policy and it is also supported by various high-profile non-government organisations (NGOs) such as Community Aid Abroad and Freedom from Hunger.

There is also the actual 'domestic constituency'⁹⁶ of those members of the community directly involved in Foreign Affairs and Defence but numbers have reduced significantly in recent years. This constituency could also include academics and researchers involved in foreign policy. Such groups have tended to act in limiting the bounds beyond which a government can go in radicalising its national security policies.

Media

The media in Australia is both a vehicle reflecting foreign policy outcomes and a source of input to that process.⁹⁷

By their very nature, members of the media tend to focus on the more interesting or sensationalist aspects of national security policy. However, journalists do provide some information on national security policy issues that would otherwise go unnoticed by a dispersed and apathetic public. Members of the media have the

resources to investigate in depth certain issues, and provide a wide variety of opinions on a topic that will assist in 'keeping the government honest'. On the other hand, they can also oversimplify issues or create news themselves by offending foreign governments or sensibilities. The overall result, Hugh Smith suggests, is to create a 'distorted impression of international politics'.⁹⁸ Further to this, Paul Kelly, International Editor of the *Australian* newspaper and a senior and respected journalist himself, recently opined that 'the media enjoys the fact that Australia is at peace but it has no concept of Australia's strategic position in the world.'⁹⁹ While it would be desirable to include media representatives in certain national security forums, the selection process would need to be very judicious.

Industry/Private Sector

The problem facing Australia now, as in the past, is how best to use her resources.¹⁰⁰

Globalisation and the information revolution have resulted in an increasing proportion of wealth and information available to industry. Much of the information gathered by the private sector is not readily available to government. In fact, the preciousness of certain corporate knowledge gives industry sway and power over elements of government. This was recognised in Australia by the 1970s but, while the information revolution has progressed, the mechanisms for integrating industry information into high level policy has not significantly changed. The rate of change in the industrial and technological sector has already driven Defence to more closely engage industry in direct support of the nation's defence capability.¹⁰¹ Indeed, in some circumstances, this will involve industry supporting deployed elements directly.¹⁰²

If industry is therefore gaining more information, and is becoming more involved in security and defence operations, it logically follows that it should therefore also play a greater part in the decision-making process. Arguments against such moves are likely to take the view that, firstly, industry is naturally biased in its desire for profit above all else and, secondly, it should not necessarily be privy to national security information. The natural bias argument has already been overtaken by the strong participation of industry in many other facets of national and government import. Government and industry partnerships are common in development projects, especially national infrastructure, and also in science and research areas where expertise has followed market forces and public

service has not managed to retain or attract the best minds. Industry involvement also pushes government to develop best practice regimes and exposes the structure to external input.

Influences and Actors– Overview

In the defence and foreign policy arena, security decisions are driven by the bureaucracy and decided on by a small number of senior ministers. While such a structure is focused and decisive, it is also left open to popular and short-term influence particularly from, for example, the media. A broader body looking at longer term and more diverse issues would not be so vulnerable and could draw attention to such weaknesses if required. Such a body may not necessarily replace the executive decision-makers, but would provide an added level of broad impartial expertise that could review security decisions in all contexts outside domestic political concerns.

THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

*Given the wide variety of tools at the disposal of Government, a method of coordinating and controlling them would appear to be necessary.*¹⁰³

National security policy making is centralised, cellular, often complex and mostly secretive. Combined with a largely apathetic public attitude (which does appear to be gradually lessening) towards its formulation, this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. The responsibility of the executive to act wisely is great and may be summed up in the words of Sir Alan Watt: ‘The task of a Foreign Minister and his professional advisers is to pursue a policy which is sufficiently rigid to attract friends and allies but sufficiently flexible to avoid national suicide.’¹⁰⁴

The cabinet style of government supported by a bureaucratic committee system is very good at reactive decision-making in the face of traditional threats but is also inherently parochial. Some evolution has occurred and the system does allow for ‘outsiders’ to give advice to committees. However, these occasions are rare and the advisers are not given the status of full membership. Often decisions are made without the benefit of direct participation of relevant advisers. As an example, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) was not represented on high-level committees when initial discussion of East Timor peace enforcement, involving AFP personnel, was discussed.

Limiting the structure and influences to the bureaucracy and senior ministers drives policy makers to a conventional or consensus approach to national security. When the involvement of outside agencies is limited, policy-makers are confined to a tight institutional framework that is not flexible for topical, crisis, non-military and/or unconventional threat scenarios. Long term planning tends to be interest-based and, in short term planning, the approach tends to be reactive and issues-based. Australia needs a structure that transcends both these tendencies and gives it the tools to deal with an increasingly unpredictable environment.

A NEW APPROACH

*All systems recognise that the key issues of human survival security and prosperity are systemic in nature and so can only be dealt with holistically and cooperatively.*¹⁰⁵

The brief description of Australia’s security system and structure given above emphasises the unique nature of Australia’s circumstances and the fortuitous position it has developed in the world and the region by attaching itself to powerful and successful friends. The structure developed during the Second World War effectively created Australia’s national security apparatus. The War Cabinet and its post-war successors have not altered considerably in the last decades. Some amendments and actors have had certain influence but reform has been evolutionary and slow. Organisations such as ASIO and ONA have been added to help advise government but Cabinet has remained the decision-making body.

While the senior ministry has initiated change and reform in policy and continues to do so,¹⁰⁶ structural reform at high levels has rarely been an agenda because it is linked to maintenance of power. In the new security paradigm this is becoming less relevant as national governments must either reform or be left behind by changing global power relativities. Australia’s current arrangements have proved satisfactory in dealing with older security problems but may not in the future have the wherewithal to account for all security related contingencies.

In Defence, the diarchy of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary has remained intact over the last few decades with the CDF perhaps increasing in influence and power. The role of the intelligence

chiefs has been maintained, but is partially diffused by the lack of a central authority such as that of the power of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the United States. The heads of ONA, ASIO, ASIS, DIO and other intelligence bodies can provide unilateral and committee (eg. through SCNS, HIAM) advice, while being largely responsible to their own Ministers. Despite this, overlaps in intelligence assessments still occur and estimates may differ depending on the influence of different organisations or directors at a particular time. The role of the Ministers is generally dependent on their relationship with their department, the Prime Minister and their intelligence organisations at their disposal. There is no 'National Security Adviser' and the SCNS has a limited capacity to review and recommend policy action on a wider security perspective.

Unlike the United States, Australia did not create a comprehensive establishment to fight the Cold War. While some extra resources and commitment were given to national intelligence agencies, their conduct was still managed by the executive: the Prime Minister and his relevant ministers. The political and economic stability of post-war Australia did not bring other security issues into the realm of the bureaucracy. Various committees, inquiries, groups and lobbyists were raised and consulted on specific issues but these were only loosely coordinated. In general, crises were few and could be addressed by the relevant departments and ministers. However, the complexity of new era security needs a much more 'whole of government' approach.

Such an approach has been attempted before. The Hawke Government tried to overcome long term planning problems in the economic sphere by establishing an Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) after summit meetings with business, union and community representatives discussed economic issues. The Council had federal, state and private sector representation but was not given enough effective input into government policy and eventually foundered under the pressure of immediate economic priorities. Prime Minister Keating abolished the Council but retained its research functions in an Economic Planning Advisory Commission 'since amalgamated by the Howard government with the Bureau of Industry Economics and the industry Commission to form the Productivity Commission.'¹⁰⁷ It is now time for a similar move in the security sphere, and the relevance

of such a body cannot be left to founder by limiting its charter or outlook.

Briefly, the broad structure and resources that are currently employed for national security are not optimised for openness, accountability and effectiveness. The current paradigm demands institutional adaptability from all of its structures, and elements of government should not be exempt. Certain aspects of the system still operate efficiently but with the increase in actors and issues over the last thirty years confronting the national decision-making process, the system is not capable of handling a large amount of information and does not possess the resources to respond. There will not be a popular move to change the system unless Australia is *in extremis*, so reform must be generated from within. This is, after all, in line with reforms for all sectors of governments where efficiency savings have been required. There is no doubt Australia has a good base to develop a security apparatus that can be flexible and dynamic for the changing security environment. It is clear that:

- While Australia has a history of strategic review and has now developed a document that outlines our national diplomatic and strategic interest, a broad national security policy and framework is absent.
- Australia's national security apparatus has not changed significantly since the end of World War Two. In addition, it has not been sufficiently challenged or reviewed due to its heavy reliance on the protective alliance with the United Kingdom and United States within world war and cold war contexts.
- There is, arguably, a lack of interest and expertise in national security at the political level.¹⁰⁸
- The principles of Australia's national interest need to be fully developed into an overall policy framework. The maintenance of a 'good citizen' approach within the context of western liberal values and human rights needs to be supported by robust national policy and authority.

Actors and Issues. The direction and execution of past security policy has been almost entirely based on the character of the government of the day and, in particular, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The future environment and the new concepts of security that need to be addressed by Australia will bear little resemblance to the values held during the cold war period. As an example, the regional security factors have changed significantly and the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda has a significantly increased importance. Australia will need to cope with state disintegration and integration, new forms of conflict that are not yet understood, threats from non-traditional sources (eg environment) and issues will tend to be regional and global, rather than national. The strategic and defence paradigm that dominated Western strategic thinking for thirty years after World War Two has now ended and we are in a state of flux.

The maintenance of the current security apparatus was barely an adequate response in a benign peacetime environment. In today's period of change and tomorrow's era of multi-dimensional issues it runs the risk of being ill-informed about the real security issues. In conflict or in multiple threat or crisis situations it will be inadequate in addressing all the real security issues. The current security apparatus is essentially a reactive one, having not fully emerged from a unique historical situation and a strong overarching alliance relationship.

The most likely future military operations that Australia will undertake are likely to be regional conflicts and in the form of a coalition. The required force structure of the ADF will differ from its post-war emphases and it will need, within financial limits, to perform an increasing range of new security tasks. Broader security roles will not, and should not, be confined to peacekeeping.

While the ADF and some other departments have reviewed their decision-making processes and made some moves towards a more unified process, there is not much evidence to suggest that higher level government security processes have undergone similar reviews.¹⁰⁹ Overriding these past and current observations, there are significant changes to the future security environment that will affect Australia's approach to security.

While some departments have made significant attempts to update their internal planning and advisory structures, the highest levels of the national security structure remain entrenched and are insulated from public and bureaucratic criticism. It is my contention that the executive does not have sufficient tools and a supportive structure to undertake national security decision-making in the next century. The structure is almost as old as federation and has little legislative and limited advisory support outside the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy itself is not structured to incorporate public, academic or corporate advice in any routine or inclusive manner and the focus of national security remains obscure.

A two-pronged approach is required: to educate the electorate and make a wider-looking, more accountable structure for national security decision-making.

Broader security concepts. We need to stress the importance of the broad concept of security to our government, politicians and electorate. All sectors of the community need to understand the issues at play. In turn, decision-makers should be informed by all facets of society and the bureaucracy to make the most appropriate national security decisions. Meetings on national security issues need to be regular and inclusive. A broader perspective must be brought to bear on national security issues. Threats to the environment and the commercial viability of Australian resources need to be further emphasised in national decision-making.

Review structure. The current structure has remained essentially the same over the last sixty years and remains based on a pure 'realist' philosophy and agenda. The predominance of strategic policy over broader security concepts remains strong and outdated approaches to security thinking have become entrenched. At high levels, the process is coordinated in a part-time fashion contributing to a limited and parochial agenda. The decision-making structure needs to be reformed to include other elements of national information and resources. New apolitical organisations would also help to depoliticise much of the higher-level national security deliberations.¹¹⁰ In the long term, the security executive would be better informed and achieve broader consensus. In crisis situations any new, broader body could be a control group to review decisions and make appropriate

recommendations on the effects of immediate decision-making. Its authority may need to be finely balanced to enhance timely decision making and to prevent it from being obstructionist. Measures could include:

- **Creating a new National Security Body.** A new level of national security analysis should be created between the bureaucracy and the executive. This could take the form of:
 - a *National Security Council* along the lines of the US model, backed by legislation and statutory authority, with the National Security Adviser represented on the National Security Committee of Cabinet and having direct access to relevant Ministers, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition such as that given to the Director-General of Security (head of ASIO).¹¹¹
 - a *National Security Board* with statutory advisory powers and broad community representation (possible members to include: academic, industry, media, opposition, minor parties, environmental group representatives), or
 - a combination of different agencies, (including a *Parliamentary Committee on National Security*, a *National Security Adviser* separate from the bureaucracy and executive and a *National Security Forum* of academics, private industry and lobbyists with formal representation on, or available to, all high level bodies).
- **Making the National Security Committee of Cabinet more open.** While the principle of Cabinet confidentiality is recognised, there may be scope to provide more information on the deliberations of the NSC than currently exists. Agenda items and the frequency of meetings are not generally sensitive, and general information on these areas could be made available to stimulate debate and further discussion outside the executive. Details of discussions could still be withheld.
- **Reviewing Operation of SCNS.** SCNS seems to be a staffing filter for submissions and information briefs. It should be given more proactive terms of reference or scaled back to its former role as an intelligence and security committee responsible to the executive, leaving broader security recommendations to a new National Security Council or Board.
- **Refining the scope of the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).** This group could retain its current focus on strategic policy and its informal nature could be retained with formally refined terms of reference. A representative could be part of any new national Security Council or board but this may be counter-productive to specific departmental representation. Despite its departmental membership, its rationale is more in line with the new procedures for addressing security matters.¹¹²
- **Encouraging open forums.** We need public and open forums where all players can voice opinions on national security. The people involved must be allowed to speak freely even if involved in government processes. Hard questions need to be posed and not sanitised by the aura of political correctness. Consideration should be given to allow parliamentary protection, or 'in camera' sessions, for serving bureaucrats and defence personnel, when in committee, to permit free speech.
- **Increasing the use of open source information.** More formal mechanisms should be used to harness the large academic knowledge base and other sources of information. At the least, expert commentators and analysts should be represented in any new organisations and the intelligence agencies should have academic liaison officers as part of their open source intelligence apparatus. Recognition of the increasingly reduced distinction between classified and public assessments needs to be made and exploited.¹¹³
- **Increasing Efficiency.** We must strive for effectiveness and not just efficiency for its own sake. There is no need for an 'efficient' defence force, foreign affairs department or security service if it is unable to undertake the task required of it. The efficiency cry of economic rationalism must not be allowed to subvert national security processes and outcomes. National security should be the highest budgetary priority of government.

- **Recognising change.** International relations phenomena such as globalisation and ethno-nationalism processes need to be better understood and considered in all aspects of security planning. These issues have a very strong influence on all decisions, but most particularly on regional issues, where they are considered either driving, or controversial, forces. Greater education is required on these matters to improve decision-making and increase our global influence. A broader understanding of these issues will have benefits in many practical arenas such as the economy and the environment.

Ethics and corruption. Our national security structure must be, and be seen to be, above corruption, bias and undue influence. Notwithstanding the pressures to be responsive to modes of fashion, the strength of the West and Australia remains the protection of its egalitarian philosophy, fair justice systems and the principle of freedom of speech. Attacks on these structures and societal pillars should be viewed by decision-makers in a national security context.

CONCLUSION

While recent statements have begun to address broader security concepts, the structural mechanisms in government have not changed. The recommendations in this paper are only a first step in proposing a new approach to national security. They are designed to broaden the advice and information available and increase public accountability in the most important affairs of national consequence. The proposals are ambitious and speculative but increased debate is one aim of these proposals and has long been an aim of many national security commentators. Future issues that need to be addressed include the balance between long term and crisis management roles, the relative weight of new security areas, and the openness of decision-making and public input. Importantly, the critical questions of the future will need to be seen to be addressed by Australians, their government and national structures in a globalised world of increasingly open information and clearer, broader human rights principles and accountability.

APPENDIX A

The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC)

Membership

The NSC is a sub-committee of Cabinet comprising the following six Ministers:

The Prime Minister (Chairman)
Deputy Prime Minister
Treasurer
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister for Defence
Attorney-General

In time of defence-related crises the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) routinely attends. Interestingly, NSC members are not security vetted but 'have the highest security clearances of any of the Government members'.¹¹⁴

Support

The NSC is supported by the International Division of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and also draws on the resources of the Cabinet Secretariat under the Government and Corporate Group of the same department. The International Division's function is to support 'matters relating to the role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in Australia's foreign, defence, trade and aid policies; the security and intelligence community; and law enforcement.'¹¹⁵

Recent Past

In 1990, Michael Codd wrote 'The Security Committee deals with matters relating to national and international security, but not with general defence or foreign policy issues, which are usually considered in Cabinet itself'.¹¹⁶

In the 1991 *Cabinet Handbook* (under the fourth Hawke Ministry) the 'Security Committee' was described as a 'functional committee ... to deal with national and international security issues and some major law enforcement matters (particularly matters concerning the National Crime Authority)'.¹¹⁷ Minutes of the Security Committee 'relating to sensitive matters ... are not normally submitted for Cabinet endorsement'.¹¹⁸ In the 1991 Security Committee, Ministers were unable to deputise their responsibilities.

Current Role

Following its election in 1996, the Howard Government members of the NSC endorsed the role of the committee outlined in the 1994 *Cabinet Handbook*:

[...]the National Security Committee [shall] be the focus for discussion and decision on major issues, including strategic developments, of relevance to Australia's national security interests;

[...]the NSC [shall] also consider policy issues in relation to:

- intelligence and domestic security matters; and

- law enforcement matters which involve security aspects or major strategic issues;¹¹⁹

In addition:

[...] as a general rule, and having regard to the highly classified nature of some of the issues and the confidentiality requirements, the minutes of the NSC carry full authority without endorsement by Cabinet;¹²⁰

Frequency of meetings

The NSC generally meets every three weeks but it convened twenty-two times during the critical two months of the East Timor crisis (September–October 1999).

Note: The current NSC is governed by principles outlined in the Liberal and National Parties' Policy Document, *Australia's Defence* (see Appendix C). This document refers to a need to 'replace the (then) Security Committee of Cabinet which had a narrow defence and intelligence focus and hardly ever met ... broadening the definition of strategic interests to include economic, trade and cultural factors as well as military aspects ... and foreshadowed the formation of the Secretaries Committee on National Security'.¹²¹

APPENDIX B

Secretaries' Committee on National Security (SCNS) ¹²²

With regard to the secretaries' committee on national security or SCNS, the NSC agreed the following terms of reference (TOR):

To provide coordinated advice to the NSC on national security policy, including approaches to international strategic developments and major issues of long term relevance to Australia's economic, political, trade and defence interests, particularly where those interests interact.

SCNS is the feeder committee for NSC: anything going to NSC usually is considered by SCNS beforehand. Draft cabinet submissions are carefully scrutinised by SCNS and it is very rare for a submission to arrive at NSC without total agreement, which is what the NSC was looking for when it stipulated the provision of coordinated advice.

But there are occasions when a department will dissent on an issue and ask their Minister to argue the case for them in the NSC (although Ministers are not obliged to accept their department's recommendations). Good staff work, liaison and preparation should ensure that our Minister doesn't get ambushed.

The intention of the SCNS to perform a watchdog function of the cost and activities of the member agencies of the AIC is reflected in the next section of the SCNS TOR:

To provide coordinated advice other NSC on the activities of departments and agencies in connection with intelligence and domestic security matters, including:

- resources, staffing policies and cost effectiveness
- priorities
- national interest considerations; and
- propriety

The final section of the TOR clearly allocates to the SCNS the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of NSC decisions and national security policy in general:

Consistent with the policy directions of the National Security Committee to:

coordinate and oversee the implementation of policies and programs relevant to national security policy

coordinate and provide guidance to departments and agencies involved in intelligence and domestic security.

There is a strong thread of coordination through these TOR. This is particularly relevant to the intelligence agencies that have benefited from the role of the SCNS in this regard.

It also explains the membership of the committee itself, [which] comprises the Secretaries of:

- PM&C (Chair)
- Defence and CDF
- Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Attorney General's
- Treasury
- DGONA

and as required ASIS, ASIO, DIO, DSD, AFP etc.

In the first seven months of operation from May to December 1996 the NSC handled forty-five separate agenda items. In 1997 they handled thirty-eight, and in 1998, sixty-one.

At the same time the SCNS dealt with forty-three items in 1997 and fifty in 1998.

Why the discrepancy? In the first instance, some of the issues, which go to SCNS, do not progress to the NSC. Many of the intelligence issues, for example, are dealt with by SCNS in its coordinating role. Also, many of the items considered by the NSC are raised without submission or at late notice – ‘under the line’. In most cases these are items of an urgent nature which need to be brought to the notice of government quickly and do not need a full Cabinet submission.

Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG)

The SPCG has a more informal style and discusses current issues determined by a rotating chair. It does not consider formal papers like the SCNS. Meetings are not regularly planned but are generally monthly and coordinated by a (rotating) host department. There are no formal terms of reference.

Membership

Membership of seven is generally at Deputy Secretary (DEPSEC) and First Assistant Secretary (FAS) level and includes:

- DEPSEC, and one FAS (PM&C)
- DEPSEC S, VCDF and HIP (Defence)
- DEPSEC and one FAS (DFAT)

The SPCG clearly works as an informal networking body for the principal players determining Australia’s strategic policy. In the words of one commentator, ‘the SPCG is primarily responsible for preparing the nation’s day-to-day and long term strategic security judgments and policy options.’¹²³

The SPCG primarily deals with politico-military issues: ‘the work [of the SPCG] involves assessing the interactions between military, diplomatic, covert intelligence, economic, social and political variables on a regional and global scale and trying to fit them into policy responses for a range of future possibilities.’¹²⁴

The small, informal nature of this group would seem to make it an ideal forum for exploring unconventional future scenarios and contingencies. The style of this group may be a good example of how to operate future, more broadly-based groups.

APPENDIX C

Excerpt from Liberal and National Parties' Policy Document

*Australia's Defence*²⁵

- 2.9 National security policy in the 1990s calls for a broad definition of strategic interests – one that takes proper account of the changing balance of military, economic, trade and cultural factors. The current structure of national security policy making is too compartmentalised between competing perspectives. Australia needs a better coordinated national security policy, which more effectively reflects the interaction between our international economic, political, trade and defence interests.
- 10.10 The Security Sub-Committee of Cabinet, which has met over recent years on an irregular and ad hoc basis, will be replaced by a National Security Committee (of Cabinet). The National Security Committee will consist of the Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, the Attorney-General and the Treasury. Other Ministers will be seconded to the Committee when specific issues relevant to their portfolios are being addressed. The National Security Committee will be the focal point of decision-making on national security. It will meet regularly and consider strategic developments and major issues of medium to long-term relevance to Australia's national security interests.
- 10.11 The Secretaries' Committee on National Security will replace the non-operative Defence committee and will report to the National Security Committee. Its seniority will send a clear message of its centrality to the national security decision-making process. The SCNS will be chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its core membership will include the Departmental Secretaries from Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Attorney-General's and the Treasury, and the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments. Other departmental heads will be involved as appropriate, as will the other heads of the Security and Intelligence agencies as required. The SCNS will meet at least monthly, or more often as appropriate. The role of the existing Strategic Policy Coordination Group, which currently operates at the Deputy Secretary level between the Department of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Prime Minister and Cabinet, will be reviewed.
- 10.12 A small office to support the National Security Committee and Secretaries' Committee on National Security will be located in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet on a cost neutral basis. The responsibilities of the National Security Committee Office will include:
- the provision of secretariat and administrative assistance to support the Cabinet Committee and Secretaries' Committee
 - advice to the Secretary of PM&C on national security matters relevant to the Secretaries' Committee
 - liaison between Departments on national security issues
 - a development and coordination role in national security policy
- The Coalition will create the National Security Committee of Cabinet to act as the focal point of decision making on national security.

APPENDIX D

Excerpt from Australian Labor Party Policy Document¹²⁶

‘A Better Plan for Defence’

Labor’s Initiatives

Strengthening National Security

Armed defence is a fundamental basis of a country’s national security. However, Labor recognises that effective national security relies on much more than simply armed defence.

Foreign policy, customs services, international crime detection, immigration policies, trade and economic policies all combine to contribute to a nation’s security.

Accordingly, Labor will expand the role of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) to oversee the

- Formulation, development and management of an integrated national security policy and strategy; and
- Preparation and coordination of national security assessments

In particular, more attention will be devoted to:

- The protection of critical infrastructure such as power and water supply, transport systems, communication networks, and information systems; and
- Assessing the impact on Australia’s security of:
 - Regional and global economic developments;
 - Transnational crime, especially drugs and money laundering;
 - Environmental degradation;
 - The spread of disease;
 - Illegal migration; and
 - Potential resource scarcities

In fulfilling these expanded roles, the NSCC will task particular agencies with specific responsibilities of the development of necessary policy and the subsequent coordination of implementation strategies. Where appropriate, the NSCC will establish National Security Coordinating groups (NSCGs) to:

- Audit vital infrastructure security preparedness, including recommendations on desirable future developments; and
- provide assessments of security implications of non-traditional security issues such as those listed above.

APPENDIX E

National Agencies, Departmental Divisions and Organisations with Responsibilities Broadly Related to Intelligence and Security¹²⁷ Intelligence Agencies

Office of National Assessments (ONA)	Prime Minister and Cabinet
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)	Defence
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)	Defence
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)	Attorney-General's
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)	DFAT

Other 'Security' Agencies (author's description)

Attorney-General's (Justice)

Australian Federal Police (AFP)

Australian Customs Service (ACS)(incl. Coastwatch)

National Crime Authority (NCA)

Australian Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)

Protective Security Coordination Centre (PSCC)

Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth–State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SACPAV)

Special Interdepartmental Committee on Protection Against Violence (SIDC– PAV).

Office of International Law (OIL)

National Police Research Unit (NPRU)

Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI)

Australian Protective Service (APS)

Communications

National Office of the Information Economy (NOIE)

Australian Communications Authority (ACA)

Environment

Environmental Protection Group (EPG)

The National Environment Protection Council (NEPC)

Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS)

National Heritage Trust

*Defence (all agencies)**Foreign Affairs and Trade (all agencies)**Health*

Population Health Division

Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Refugee and Humanitarian Division

Border Control and Compliance Division

Industry, Science and Resources

Australian Geological Survey Organisation and other Scientific Advisory Bodies

Prime Minister and Cabinet

Cabinet Secretariat

International Division

Transport

Aviation Security and Olympics Branch

Territories Business Unit

Treasury

International Economy Division

Foreign Investment Policy Division

APPENDIX F

Parliamentary Committees Related to National Security¹²⁸

Joint Statutory Committees

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Corporations and Securities
National Crime Authority

Joint Standing Committees

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (appointed 7 December 1998)
Migration (appointed 7 December 1998)
Treaties (appointed 7 December 1998)

Senate Standing Committees

Economics
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legal and Constitutional

Senate Select Committees

Information Technologies

House of Representatives Standing Committees

Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources

- ¹ D. Horne, *The Lucky Country*, 3rd ed. (Ringwood, Vic: Penguin Books, 1971).
- ² See *Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force*, A Public Discussion Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2000), p. 4.
- ³ Such as the recent example of East Timor *in extremis*.
- ⁴ A. Cobb, 'Thinking about the Unthinkable: Australian Vulnerabilities to High-Tech Risks' *Research Paper 18*, 1997–8, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 29 Jun 1998), p. 7, accessed via <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp18.htm> on 13 Oct 1999.
- ⁵ For debates on the concept of security see B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), and A. Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol' in *Discord and Collaboration 7* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), Ch. 10.
- ⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, c. 1998), <http://www.dfat.gov.au/> accessed 5/11/98.
- ⁷ M. Ablong, 'Enunciating a Security Policy for Australia: A Holistic Approach to Defence Planning' in *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 127 (1997), p. 36.
- ⁸ *In the National Interest*, p. 2.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3.
- ¹⁰ S. Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Planning* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1998), p. 92.
- ¹¹ 'Realism' and its modern reaffirmation 'Neo-realism' stress the primacy of states in the international system, and stress the subordinate power and role of 'non-state' actors. The primary tenets of the latter were laid out by Hedley Bull in *The Anarchical Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) and Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Relations*, (New York: Random House, 1979). See Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1994) for a comprehensive overview of the contending international relations theories.
- ¹² Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Planning*, p. 92.
- ¹³ Discussion, Intelligence Policy Section, Department of Defence, and the author, 4 November 1999. See also Appendix A.
- ¹⁴ Frankel, *National Interest* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p.15.
- ¹⁵ See Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study of American Foreign Policy*, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1977, c1934) and James N. Rosenau, 'National Interest' in *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, ed. David Sills (New York: MacMillan, 1968), for explorations of the history and concept of national interest.
- ¹⁶ Frankel, *National Interest.*, p. 21. See also Chapter One for the meanings, history and usages of the concept of 'national interest'.
- ¹⁷ 'Foreword', *In the National Interest*, p. 1.
- ¹⁸ *The Australian Political System*, 2nd edn, ed. D. Lovell, I. McAllister, W. Maley, C. Kukathas (Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), p. 755.
- ¹⁹ Ablong, 'Enunciating a Security Policy for Australia', p. 35.
- ²⁰ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*. See Introduction and, specifically, p. 7.
- ²¹ G. Cheeseman, 'Alternative Futures', in *Testing the Limits, The Proceedings of a Conference held by the RAAF in Canberra*, ed. S. Clarke (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1998), p. 66.
- ²² H. Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy' in *Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions*, ed. F. Mediansky (Sydney: Macmillan, 1992), p.19.
- ²³ G. Evans, 'Australia's Place in the World', Address to ANU Bicentennial Conference, *Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects*, 6 December 1988, pp 4–5.
- ²⁴ *In the National Interest*, p. 3.

- 25 Ablong, 'Enunciating a Security Policy for Australia', p. 34.
- 26 N. Viviani, 'The Bureaucratic Context' in *Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions*, ed. Mediansky, p. 48.
- 27 For an interesting view on this see 'Australians and Foreign Policy' in T. B. Millar, *Foreign Policy: Some Australian Reflections*, (Melbourne: Georgian House, 1972), pp. 1–6.
- 28 J. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (Milton, Qld: Jacaranda, 1973), p. 30.
- 29 Salient points in this section are partly derived from notes taken at the *From Civil Strife to Civil Society, Civil–Military Cooperation in Disrupted States Conference*, convened by Australian Defence Studies Centre, UNSW, ADFA and Key Centre for Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University, at the National Convention Centre, Canberra, 6–7 Jul 1999.
- 30 Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 72.
- 31 J. Ure, and M. Bird, *The Criminal Threat in Australia*, Paper delivered at the conference *Australia and PNG: Crime and the Bilateral Relationship*, 11–12 Nov 1998, Old Parliament House, Canberra 1998, p. 1.
- 32 For definitions and trends in transnational crime see J. McFarlane, and K. McLennan, *Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm*, Working Paper No 294 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996) and J. McFarlane, *Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Background, Prospects and Countermeasures*, Working paper No 335 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999), p. 2.
- 33 See A. Dupont, *Drugs, Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia*, Working paper No 328, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998), p.3.
- 34 J. Hewson, 'Price of Being the Lucky Country' in *Australian Financial Review*, 26 November 1999, p. 49.
- 35 The global population is six billion, having doubled since 1960. See A. Jones, 'Our Land's Not So Rich with Nature's Gifts' *Australian*, 13 October 1999, p.17.
- 36 See J. MacFarlane, *Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region*, and A. Dupont, 'Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security Dilemma?', *Pacifica Review*, 9 (1997).
- 37 More than 1000 (mostly Middle Eastern) 'boat people' entered Australia from October to the end of November 1999: 'Third Boatload of Illegal Immigrants Enters Waters', *Canberra Times*, 29 November 1999, p.3.
- 38 A. Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 10 December 1996 quoted in *The Australian Political System*, ed. D. Lovell, I. McAllister, W. Maley, C. Kukathas, 2nd edn. (Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), p. 751.
- 39 B. Burdekin, Former Human Rights Commissioner in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT), *A Review Of Australia's Efforts To Promote And Protect Human Rights*, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1994), pp 13–14.
- 40 Australian Red Cross (ARC), National Committee on International Humanitarian Law, *Terms of Reference* (Carlton South: National Office, ARC).
- 41 DFAT/AUSAID Submission to JCFADT, *A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights*, p. 851 at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/dialog/dial_ch5.pdf accessed 13 Oct 1999.
- 42 Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 21–22.
- 43 'The AFZ is the area of waters generally between three and 200 nautical miles seaward of the territorial sea baseline of Australia and its external territories, excluding waters falling within the exclusive economic zone of another country, and covers a total of 8.9 million km².' Australian Bureau of Statistics, <http://www.abs.gov.au> accessed 20 Oct 1999.
- 44 *In the National Interest*, p. 3.
- 45 See, for example, H. P. Martin, and H. Schumann, *The Global Trap: Civilisation and the Assault on Democracy and Prosperity* (London: Zed books, 1997). Martin and Schumann argue that the new global economy is generating inequality on an unprecedented scale. As our societies threaten to decompose, our politicians become impotent, with a consequent moral, spiritual and practical decline in ethics and behaviour.

- ⁴⁶ Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), p.55.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.
- ⁴⁸ See for example 'Online Crime against Companies, Countries Seen Rising', Reuters News Report, 7 December 1999, <http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1005-200-1484895.html>, accessed 8 December 1999.
- ⁴⁹ Cobb, 'Thinking about the Unthinkable', p. 4.
- ⁵⁰ For discussion on this issue see I. Dudgeon, 'The National Information Infrastructure: Threats and Vulnerabilities', Unpublished Defence Paper, February 1997 and A. Cobb, 'Electronic Gallipoli' in *Quadrant*, April 1999.
- ⁵¹ See Appendix D.
- ⁵² *Address by the Prime Minister*, National Press Club, Canberra, 8 December 1999.
- ⁵³ Sir Arthur Tange, 'Defence Policy Making in Australia' in *Army Journal*, 323 (1976), p. 4.
- ⁵⁴ *The Australian Constitution* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Education Office, 1991).
- ⁵⁵ *Combat Capability Development and Leadership of the Defence Organisation*, message circulated through Defence from CDF and Secretary, dated 2 August 1999.
- ⁵⁶ See below and Appendices A and B for further detail on the NSC and other committees.
- ⁵⁷ Press release from Prime Minister on 'Cabinet Committees', 24 November 1998. The press release was to outline the government's use of committees in their second term of office. See Appendix A for further detail.
- ⁵⁸ J. Knight, and W. J. Hudson, *Parliament and Foreign Policy*, Canberra Studies in World Affairs, 13 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1983), p.43.
- ⁵⁹ Apart from the penalties under the *Crimes Act 1914* and other legislation for illegal access to nationally classified information, Cabinet documents are further protected under Freedom of Information legislation. See *Freedom of Information, Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on the Freedom of Information Bill 1978, and Aspects of the Archives Bill 1978* (Canberra: AGPS, 1979) for a discussion of this issue.
- ⁶⁰ See Appendix D.
- ⁶¹ P. Cole-Adams, 'MPs Attack Pine Gap Secrecy' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 October 1999, p. 10. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in its report on the state of the Army also recommended that the establishment of a National Security Council be explored. See *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army* (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, August 2000), p. 181.
- ⁶² W. McLennan, *1999 Year Book Australia*, 81 (Canberra: ABS, 1999), p. 651.
- ⁶³ C. Sharman, 'Federalism' in *Australian Politics – A Fifth Reader*, ed. by Mayer and H. Nelson (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1980), p. 159.
- ⁶⁴ See J. D. B. Miller, 'Parties and Foreign Policy: The Australian Way', *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 65 (1988), cited in Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 25.
- ⁶⁵ Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 18.
- ⁶⁶ Viviani, 'The Bureaucratic Context', p. 55.
- ⁶⁷ Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 23.
- ⁶⁸ M. Codd, 'Cabinet Operations of the Australian Government' in *The Cabinet and Budget Processes*, ed. B. Galligan, J. Nethercote, and C. Walsh (Canberra: ANU Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1990), p. 1.
- ⁶⁹ D. Rigby, 'The Combined Chiefs of Staff and Anglo-American Strategic Coordination in World War II', PhD Dissertation, UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1996, p. 35.
- ⁷⁰ See Appendix A.
- ⁷¹ The mechanics of the provision of information to Cabinet and its decision-making processes are well documented in the *Cabinet Handbook*, produced by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the *Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow*, ANAO Report No 32 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1998–99), Appendix E.

- ⁷² For an observation of Foreign Policy in the Cabinet see G. Evans, and B. Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 44–48.
- ⁷³ C.W.J. Falkinder, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), Vol 52, 31 August 1966, p. 616.
- ⁷⁴ D. Atkin, and B. Jinks, *Australian Political Institutions* (Melbourne: Pitman, 1980), pp. 56–57.
- ⁷⁵ Party debate and member input into national security issues remains minimal. The parliamentary parties in particular rely greatly on a small number of members with experience or influence on foreign, defence and security issues. The considerable influence of a well-qualified and articulate Minister such as Kim Beazley in Defence (1984–90) is a prime example. While the ruling party has a bureaucracy to assist it in policy development, the opposition party is reduced to a small number of interested members and advisers. Opposition defence and foreign policies have tended to be vague or incremental in their suggestion for reforms.
- ⁷⁶ In particular the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT). See also Appendix E for a list of committees that can be related to national security areas.
- ⁷⁷ Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 27.
- ⁷⁸ M. Abrow, *Bureaucracy* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 22.
- ⁷⁹ Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *The Management of Australia's Defence* (Canberra: AGPS, 1987), p. 77.
- ⁸⁰ Paul Dibb coins this term in his discussion of Defence practice in this area in his *Report to the Minister of Defence, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* (Canberra: AGPS, 1986), p.29.
- ⁸¹ See also B. Cole, *A New Approach To Defence, The Wrigley Report and After*, Policy Paper No 19 (Perth: Australian Institute for Public Policy, 1990), pp. 23–25 for comments on Defence decision-making and bureaucratic obfuscation.
- ⁸² See Appendix B for terms of reference and role of SCNS.
- ⁸³ Within Defence there is now a Defence Intelligence Board 'to help ensure Australia maintains its strategic edge' with a chairman accountable for the board's performance. See G. Barker, 'Moore Aims for Defence "Edge"', *Australian Financial Review*, 29 October 1999, p. 3. However, the coordination role for this board outside Defence is unclear.
- ⁸⁴ I. Wing, 'From Intelligence to 'Info-Intelligence': Debunking the Intelligence versus Information Paradigm', Paper presented at the annual conference of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers, 'Intel 99', Sydney, 20 October 1999.
- ⁸⁵ An example of an intelligence agency trying to keep up with the new phenomenon is in the new powers given to ASIO to cope with 'the rapidly changing information environment' in new legislation of 26 November 1999. See Attorney-General News (press release) 'ASIO Legislation Passed' of 26 November 1999.
- ⁸⁶ Likely specific threats in the future will probably focus on terrorism, disrupted states, information warfare and organised crime. While terrorism and information warfare have been recognised in the present structure, the issues of disrupted states and organised crime are inchoate. See below.
- ⁸⁷ A. Behm, 'National Security: Changing Perceptions' in *The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers*, 2 (1993), 2.
- ⁸⁸ G. S. Reid, 'The Trinitarian Struggle: Parliamentary–Executive Relationships' in *Australian Politics – A Fifth Reader*, p. 521.
- ⁸⁹ Behm, 'National Security', p. 26.
- ⁹⁰ The Advisory War Council drew all major political parties into the decision-making process. It was an advisory body that did not bind decisions onto the executive. Despite this, after Labor came to office, recommendations made by the Advisory War Council were normally accepted by the War Cabinet. See P. Dennis, J. Grey, E. Morris, R. Prior, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 17.
- ⁹¹ See Appendix D.
- ⁹² The Australian Democrats' security and defence policy is still under development. Some basic principles such as a reluctance to see an increase in

- defence spending and a commitment to human rights issues will be part of the policy: Discussion, Democrat Defence Adviser and the author, Parliament House, Canberra, 8 November 1999.
- ⁹³ L. Watson, 'The Party Machines', in *Australian Politics – A Fifth Reader*, p. 39.
- ⁹⁴ T. Matthews, 'Australian Pressure Groups', in *Australian Politics – A Fifth Reader*, p. 466.
- ⁹⁵ Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 36.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- ⁹⁷ G. Evans, and B. Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), p. 50.
- ⁹⁸ Smith, 'Internal Politics and Foreign Policy', p. 38.
- ⁹⁹ P. Kelly, quote from address delivered at 'East Timor – End Game or New Beginning?', seminar held by Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College, ADFA, Canberra, 3 June 1999.
- ¹⁰⁰ A.G.L. Shaw, *The Economic Development of Australia* (Melbourne: Longman, 1970), p.8.
- ¹⁰¹ See 'DICAC Gets down to Nitty-gritty', *Heads-Up 130*, <http://www.headsup.com.au> accessed 14 December 1999, for details on Defence and Industry Advisory Council initial business.
- ¹⁰² See Program Budget Statements (PBS) 1998–99 quoted in *The Deployment of Civilian Contractors in Support of Australian Defence Operations*, A Project Discussion Paper (Canberra: ADHQ Directorate of Industry Engagement, National Support Division, March 1999), p. 5.
- ¹⁰³ Ablong, 'Enunciating a Security Policy for Australia', p. 38.
- ¹⁰⁴ Sir Alan Watt, 'The Changing Margins of Australian Foreign Policy', Fifteenth Roy Milne Memorial Lecture (Adelaide: Australian Institute for International Affairs, 24 Nov 1964), p. 29.
- ¹⁰⁵ G. Cheeseman, 'Alternative Futures' quoting *Our Global Neighbourhood, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), in *Testing the Limits, The Proceedings of a Conference held by the RAAF in Canberra*, ed. S. Clarke (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1998), pp.61–2.
- ¹⁰⁶ As D. Shanahan and M. Gilchrist, recently wrote: 'John Howard has warned federal Cabinet the Coalition must keep reforming or lose the next election': 'Reform or Lose, PM Warns', *Australian*, 14 December 1999, p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁷ G. Singleton, D. Aitkins, B. Jinks, J. Warhurst, *Australian Political Institutions*, Fifth edition, (Melbourne: Longman, 1996), p.271.
- ¹⁰⁸ See Michael O'Connor, 'A Yawning Gap in our National Security: Politicians' Ignorance is Indefensible' *Australian*, 10 June 1999, p.15. O'Connor stated that 'fewer than 20 of our 224 federal politicians have any interest in national security questions ... and most members of Cabinet ... profess almost no interest in national security.'
- ¹⁰⁹ For a review of this in a defence context, see T. Basan, 'A Framework for Unified Decision Making Process' in *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 132 (1998).
- ¹¹⁰ See M. O'Connor, 'Timor Lays Bare our Poverty of Strategy', *Australian*, 25 Nov 1999, p. 13 for a discussion of this issue.
- ¹¹¹ See sections of the *ASIO Act 1979*, (Canberra: AGPS, 1996) dealing with Ministers and the Leader of the Opposition, and the *Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization* (Canberra: AGPS, 1985), para 16.21 outlining the convention where Director-General 'may approach the Prime Minister in appropriate cases.'
- ¹¹² The main issues regarding structural reform surround the readiness of the Government to accept political structural change. If reluctant, a minimalist approach reliant on minor evolutionary change to the existing structure may be necessary. A junior minister could be appointed to oversee reformed parliamentary committees and public inquiries or commissions, where proceedings could be fed into relevant policy papers. Further broadening of the new Australian Strategic Policy Institute outside its defence realm may also be a model to build on. If it is acknowledged that increased independent and broad advice is required, a National Security Council or Board may be appropriate. This could be achieved by making a new organisation using the current relevant committees out of their parent departments or drawing from the community (as above).
- ¹¹³ For instance, as Hugh White was quoted as saying: 'what we do in our deepest and most highly classified documents is exactly what we say publicly ...': G. Barker, 'Smoke on the Horizon: Keeping Watch on our Future Security' *Australian Financial Review Magazine*, February 1999, p. 38.

- 114 See 'The Operation of the Government's National Security Mechanisms', unpublished booklet, Intelligence Policy Section, Department of Defence, March 1999, p. 4.
- 115 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet web site, <http://www.dPMC.gov.au> accessed 27 Sep 1999.
- 116 Codd, 'Cabinet Operations of the Australian Government', p. 6.
- 117 *Cabinet Handbook* (Canberra: AGPS, 1991), p. 1.
- 118 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 119 From the current *Cabinet Handbook*, 4th Edition, (Canberra: AGPS, 1994), p. 2. Although the handbook predates the current government, membership of the NSC has not essentially changed from previous governments' Security Committees.
- 120 'The Operation of the Government's National Security Mechanisms', Unpublished Defence Department Booklet, Intelligence Policy Section, March 1999, p. 4
- 121 *Australia's Defence*, authorised A. Robb (Melbourne: A. Robb, 1996).
- 122 This appendix entirely based on *The Operation of the Government's National Security Mechanisms*, pp. 5–6.
- 123 G. Barker, 'Smoke on the Horizon', p. 37. Also see article for a general review of SPCG activity and a look at its members.
- 124 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 125 *Australia's Defence*, authorised A. Robb, pp. 4–5.
- 126 Source: <http://www.alp.org.au/campaign/policy/defence/index.html> of 30 October 1998, accessed 27 January 1999, pp. 1–2.
- 127 Author's assessment.
- 128 This list is not exhaustive and is designed to give a perspective on the wide range of committees that may have direct or indirect influence or knowledge about matters affecting national security.