Companion to East Timor - Countdown to Freedom
Countdown to Freedom
When Suharto resigned on 21st May 1998, his vice-president, B.J. Habibie, was sworn in as President. There were three serious and urgent challenges facing the new government and the still-powerful military: the financial crisis, the pro-democracy movement, which was calling for more reforms, and the provinces of Aceh, West Papua and East Timor, which were demanding greater autonomy and even self-determination.
The independence of East Timor was now well and truly on the agenda. The East Timorese and their supporters around the world sensed that at long last their moment was at hand. The local newspaper in Dili, Suara Timor Timur, noticed that possibilities had opened up. It reported that Congressman Chris Smith, head of the US Congressional Sub-Committee for International Affairs and Human Rights, had visited Jakarta to discuss 'new elections, the release of political prisoners, the status of the anti-subversion law, East Timor and Xanana.' Suara Timor Timur represented the opinion of civilian collaborators with the Indonesian occupation; they knew that times were changing and were trying to re-position themselves accordingly. On the streets of Dili, of course, people didn't need to be told to seize the moment. Higher wages were demanded by taxi drivers and village transport employees, and students demanded fairer high-school admissions procedures. Inevitably, though, the demands converged on the crucial issue of self-determination. Students at the University of East Timor organised free speech forums nearly every day during the first two weeks in June 1998. They discussed reformasi, and demanded the release of political prisoners and the right to self-determination. Protests in Dili were accompanied by protests in the Indonesian heartland of Java, in particular the capital Jakarta, where thousands of university students of East Timorese descent picketed the offices of DEPLU, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Read more about Jude Conway here.
Read more about the journalist Lindsay Murdoch here.
The Indonesian military leadership, already unsettled by the mass mobilisation on the streets of East Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia, was further stunned by a helicopter crash at Liaruka, 170 km southeast of Dili. Killed in the crash were almost all the high-ranking military officers from the military command area that included East Timor: the commander, Major General Yudomo Sastrosuhardjo, and the commander of the forces inside East Timor itself Colonel Salamat Sidabutar. The Indonesian authorities were also taken aback by the boldness of the young people of East Timorese, who had been growing more courageous and more desperate with each passing year of the occupation.
In his first television interview as President on 3 June 1998, Dr Habibie had ruled out a referendum in East Timor. However, he came under pressure immediately because of the increasing unrest in East Timor, the heightened international interest in post-Suharto Indonesia and his own need to establish his democratic credentials. He was therefore forced to offer what he called 'special status' one week later, 'under one condition that East Timor is recognised as an integrated part of the Republic of Indonesia.' His foreign minister, Ali Alatas, actively promoted this new position, calling it 'a new opportunity or big chance to seek a comprehensive and fair solution that can be accepted by all parties on the East Timor problem.' Abilio Soares, the puppet governor of East Timor, convened a meeting at his official residence in an effort to convince the public to accept the offer. It was attended by a number of prominent East Timorese and about 2,000 members of the public. When Soares spoke up in favour of 'greater autonomy', he was jeered by the audience, which demanded a referendum on independence. Later, leaders of the newly-formed East Timorese Student Solidarity Council immediately rejected all talk of autonomy, and also demanded a UN-supervised referendum on independence.
The Howard government was providing maximum diplomatic cover for Indonesia's offer of autonomy by talking down the chances of a referendum. In a visit to Jakarta in July 1998, Alexander Downer dismissed calls for a referendum, saying that East Timor was 'obviously a very divided place. There is no point trying to solve the issue with a quick fix.' Later that month, Downer traveled to the Philippines for annual talks between the Association of South-East Asian Nations and its chief partners. He re-affirmed his government's rejection of calls for self-determination: 'I do not think that immediately moving into some sort of active self-determination in East Timor is a solution at all.'
The economic situation in Indonesia was plunging to new depths. In the second quarter of 1998, real GDP was 16.5% below the same period in 1997. The exchange rate was at Rp 11,000/US$1. This was more than four times lower than the previous year. Imported goods had become prohibitively expensive. As a consequence, total imports had fallen to almost half the pre-crisis level. Inflation was sky-rocketing. The price of food was soaring and the purchasing power of the rupiah was plummeting. Wage-earners had lost more than a third of their real incomes. Domestic unrest was threatening to get out of control. To compound all this, oil prices – a key source of government revenues – were stagnating at $10-12 per barrel. In the midst of all this, international activism about East Timor was a problem that President Habibie simply did not need. Buffeted from all sides, he moved to take some more steam out of the East Timor issue. On 24 July 1998, a program of troop withdrawals, beginning with 1000 combat troops, was announced. Habibie also said that combat troops would gradually be replaced by troops more suited to civil improvement projects. In fact, the troops were not withdrawn at all. Five battalions landed under cover of darkness north of Los Palos. Activists in Australia, who were in regular contact with the East Timorese, tried to draw attention to the deception, but the government dismissed their claims. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer praised the decision to withdraw troops, calling them 'a step in the right direction.' He said he had been assured that more withdrawals would follow:
'I discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Alatas. He has confirmed media reports that troop numbers would be reduced. He has confirmed a figure of about a thousand and tells me that this is to be the first in a series of withdrawals.'
However, in October 1998, a large number of Indonesian army personnel records were smuggled out of East Timor by Dr Andrew McNaughtan, a Sydney-based activist. The documents showed that Indonesia's claims of withdrawal and demilitarisation in East Timor were lies. Downer tried to downplay the issue, saying he was 'attempting to verify the authenticity of the documents.' However, the dramatic exposure of the personnel records, and the extensive details contained therein, made it clear that the Indonesian authorities were lying. They had been caught out. After President Habibie decided to offer the East Timorese a referendum on independence or autonomy within Indonesia, the Indonesian authorities took steps to ensure a victory for the autonomy proposal. The Howard government worked consistently in support of Indonesia's strategy. Alexander Downer continued to publicly reject the need for peacekeepers. Emerging from a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, he said:
We hope that there won't be a need for a peacekeeping force because if you need a peacekeeping force, you need a peace to keep and peace first has to be negotiated and we hope that when the peace is negotiated it will be a peaceful peace that might require a peacekeeping force.1
On 5 May 1999, an agreement was signed at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The 5 May Agreement, as it came to be known, provided for an autonomy proposal to be put to the East Timorese people. If they accepted this proposal, the East Timor issue would be considered solved once and for all. If they rejected it, authority would be transferred to the UN, allowing East Timor to begin its passage to independence. Indonesia would have complete responsibility for maintaining security. Two days later, the Australian Defence Force began planning for logistic support to the ballot. This was known as Operation Concord. In parallel with this operation, planning was also begun for Operation Faber, which involved military observers who would serve with the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). However, Defence planners began work on another plan as well. Known as Operation Spitfire, the aim of this plan was to evacuate foreign observers (ANAO 2002:29). Now that Indonesia had gained control over 'security', it would be in a position to destroy pro-independence supporters regardless of the result of the ballot. The Indonesians were of the view that they would win the ballot. However, just in case they did not, they would need to move rapidly to reverse the result. Under these circumstances, foreign observers would impede any Indonesian action. They would have to be removed from the territory, just as they had been when Indonesia first invaded in 1975. Operation Spitfire would fit in with the Indonesian military strategy; its aim was to evacuate all foreign observers so that the Indonesians could act without witnesses. Planning for Operation Spitfire began on 11 May 1999. It was designed to evacuate personnel, not keep the peace.
The ballot was held on 30 August 1999. Despite the climate of fear, the campaign of intimidation, the presence of dubious voters from West Timor, and the fact that many voters did not believe their votes were secret, 78.5% of registered voters opted for independence from Indonesia. The results were announced on Saturday 4 September 1999. The Indonesian military began a campaign of forced displacement, driving approximately 250,000 East Timorese across the border to West Timor. According to the United Nations and a subsequent investigation by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission, approximately 70% of the buildings in East Timor were destroyed, vital infrastructure was crippled, and towns across East Timor were left without running water, electricity or telephones.
Australian defence planners implemented Operation Spitfire, which involved a military escort from the UN compound to Dili airport, and then a one-way trip out of East Timor. The evacuation of UN staff, journalists, foreign observers and a few East Timorese allowed Indonesia to act without foreign witnesses, permitting it to manoeuvre without restrictions, reverse the results of the ballot and retain East Timor. On 5 September 1999, while the burning of Dili was underway, Foreign Minisyer Alexander Downer said:
I get the impression that President Habibe, Mr Alatas, General Wiranto are all trying to do the right thing and some of the commanders are clearly trying to do the right thing.
By this stage, however, public outrage in Australia and internationally was reaching tsunami-like proportions. The Howard government finally reversed policy and asked for international assistance to convince the Indonesian military to stop. Portugal's Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, telephoned President Clinton, saying that Portuguese troops would be pulled out of Kosovo if a peacekeeping force were not deployed to East Timor. Portugal prevented sixteen US military flights from departing its airbase in the Azores. For US strategic planners, a really significant source of pressure was the US Congress, where many senators and representatives were urging immediate action. All the years of lobbying undertaken by US activists were paying off.
The US ensured that its message to the Indonesian military was delivered in person; Admiral Dennis Blair, commander-in-chief of the US forces in the Pacific, met General Wiranto in Jakarta on 8 September 1999, informing him that military ties were being suspended. Defence secretary William Cohen spoke of 'serious economic consequences.' State Department spokesman James Rubin warned that 'Indonesia's relations with the international community, including the United States, are at risk here.' The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, telephoned Indonesian Armed Forces Chief and Defence Minister, General Wiranto, several times during the week after the announcement of the referendum result. Jakarta remained adamant past the first deadline, triggering a suspension of all US military assistance. President Clinton publicly warned that:
if Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite—it must invite—the international community to assist in restoring security … it would be a pity if the Indonesian recovery were crashed by this.
In an emergency debate in the UN Security Council on 12 September 1999, US envoy Richard Holbrooke finally warned Indonesia that it faced 'the point of no return in international relations' if it did not accept an international peacekeeping force. The Indonesian military's resistance ended within hours. On 12 September 1999, Habibie and Wiranto emerged from a special cabinet meeting. Before the television cameras and microphones of the assembled international media, Habibie announced that his government had decided to allow a UN force into East Timor. Wiranto's presence beside Habibie sent a clear signal that the TNI had agreed to support the decision. Tellingly, Australian strategic planners initially named the peacekeeping force IFET – International Force East Timor. They were soon told that IFET already existed; it was the International Federation for East Timor, a global coalition of activists who had campaigned for East Timorese self-determination for years. Even at the very end, strategists were unaware of the powerful forces that had propelled them into a policy reversal. They renamed their force InterFET.
Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights
As Indonesian forces were leaving East Timor, Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, or Komnas HAM) established a special team known as the National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran HAM di Timor Timur, or KPP-HAM). KPP-HAM was required to submit its findings to Komnas HAM, which would provide them to Indonesia's Attorney-General for further investigation.
The KPP-HAM team was composed of leading Indonesian figures such as Marzuki Darusman, Albert Hasibuan, Asmara Nababan, Kusparmono Irsan, HS Dillon, Munir, Todung Mulya Lubis, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Zoemrotin K Susilo.
It paid special attention to gross violations of human rights such as genocide, massacre, torture, enforced displacement, crimes against women and children and scorched earth policies. It was empowered to investigate whether and to what extent the apparatus of State and/or other bodies, national and international, were involved in these crimes. It examined only the last nine months from January 1999 until the departure of Indonesian forces in September that year, not the 24 year occupation.
KPP-HAM commenced its investigation on 23 September 1999. It completed its report on 31st January 2000. It found 'evidence of crimes that could be classified as crimes of universal jurisdiction including systematic and mass murder; extensive destruction, enslavement, forced deportations and displacement and other inhumane acts committed against the civilian population' 2.
The report urged the parliament and the government to 'form a Human Rights Court with the authority to try the perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes against humanity' that occurred 'in the past as well as those that have occurred in East Timor to the present'. It urged the 'Government and the Attorney General' to ensure that crimes against humanity were investigated and punished 'whoever is the perpetrator', in a free and independent manner 'without any interference whatsoever'. Read it here.
Some years later, an international Commission of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General found that the KPP-HAM report was a 'genuine and impartial effort to inquire into serious human rights violations, reflecting the firm commitment of its members to establish the facts'. The Commission said that its inquiry procedures 'conformed to international standards relating to pro justicia inquiries' 3.
The International Commission of Inquiry
On 27 September 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned the 'widespread, systematic and gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in East Timor' and called upon the UN Secretary–General to establish an international commission of inquiry into the events of 1999. Accordingly, on 15th October 1999 the High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed the eminent jurists Sonia Picado of Costa Rica, Judith Sefi Attah of Nigeria, A.M. Ahmadi of India, Mari Kapi of Papua New Guinea and Sabine Leutheusser–Schnarrenberger of Germany to the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor 4.
This Commission reported that its members 'were confronted with testimonies surpassing their imagination'. It recommended that the UN 'should establish an international human rights tribunal' to bring perpetrators of serious violations to justice. It submitted its recommendations to the UN Secretary–General. Read it here.
Thematic Special Rapporteurs from the United Nations
From 4-10 November 1999, three United Nations thematic Special Rapporteurs visited East Timor. They were Asma Jahangir, special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; Nigel Rodley, special rapporteur on torture; and Radhika Coomaraswamy, special rapporteur on violence against women. Their visit was an unprecedented move, undertaken pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/S-4/1 of 27 September 1999, adopted at a special session on the situation of human rights in East Timor. The special session had been convened because of increasing reports of widespread violence and serious human rights violations in East Timor.
The Special Rapporteurs recommended that the Security Council should consider the establishment of an international criminal tribunal in order to bring the perpetrators to justice. They called for prosecutions of those responsible, 'both directly and by virtue of command responsibility, however high the level of responsibility'. They stated that an international criminal tribunal should be done preferably with the consent of the Indonesian government, but such consent should not be a prerequisite. Such a tribunal, they recommended, should have jurisdiction over all crimes under international law committed by any party in the Territory since the departure of the Portuguese in 1975.
The only qualification they attached to their recommendation was that the Indonesian government would have to take steps 'in a matter of months' to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta
Under pressure from its military, the Indonesian government took its cue from this qualification. In order to avoid responsibility, it announced the establishment of a so-called Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta. Proceedings were commenced against 18 suspects from a total of 22 identified by KPP-HAM. Ten of these 18 were military officers, five were police officers, two were civilian government officials and one was a militia leader. All 18 defendants were indicted for failing to prevent crimes against humanity, rather than for committing such crimes.
The atmosphere in the courtroom was highly intimidatory 5. Witnesses enjoyed no sense of security. One of the witnesses was made to sit beside militia figurehead Eurico Guterres, himself a defendant in another trial. Indonesian military personnel enjoyed free access to the witness waiting room. A so-called 'safe house' for witnesses had a sign placed outside it announcing that it was a witness safe house. Indonesian soldiers from the units accused of committing crimes against humanity attended the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Court en masse, some of them carrying weapons whilst in the courtroom. When they were eventually called to the witness stand, witnesses were questioned for hours without respite.
Throughout the proceedings, witnesses were ridiculed and intimidated, including by the prosecution. A witness who had suffered a serious disability during an attack was laughed at by members of the prosecution and the defence. In the public gallery were a platoon of Indonesian special forces personnel who had been bussed in for the occasion. These soldiers shouted words of warning and intimidation at the witnesses and the judges during the proceedings.
Numerous credible analyses 6 have demonstrated that the prosecution called witnesses who were manifestly unable to provide evidence that supported its case. It never attempted to show effective control or a superior-subordinate relationship between those who carried out the prohibited acts and those accused of having command responsibility. It made irrelevant closing submissions and made no attempt to show what the KPP-HAM Report had concluded, namely that the violence was a direct result of Government policy.
Judges received threats to their life both inside and outside the courtroom. Often, when a judge was about to deliver the verdict, armed soldiers in the courtroom would shout at them, leading them to be concerned about their own security. A judge in the Ad Hoc Court later conceded that the court had not made any significant contribution to strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia. The Ad Hoc Court was widely denounced as a sham. A Commission of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General concluded that the proceedings were 'manifestly inadequate with respect to investigations, prosecution and trials, and … failed to deliver justice. The atmosphere and context of the entire court proceedings were indicative of the lack of political will in Indonesia to seriously and credibly prosecute the defendants' 7.
Unsurprisingly, 12 of the 18 accused were acquitted at trial. All the others have since had their convictions overturned. The Ad Hoc court was widely denounced as a sham.
Another source of legal authority arose out of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was established on 25th October 1999 by the UN Security Council 8. UNTAET had the authority for all legislative and executive matters in East Timor, including the administration of justice. It established the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, the Serious Crimes Unit and the Defence Lawyers Unit (DLU).
There were formidable obstacles facing these institutions. Instead of conducting the prosecutions of suspected Indonesian war criminals at an international tribunal in an established venue such as The Hague, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes was established within the impoverished local structure of the Dili District Court. Similarly, the Serious Crimes Unit was established within the Office of the General Prosecutor, Longuinhos Monteiro.
When the Serious Crimes Unit requested the Special Panels for Serious Crimes to issue warrants for Yayat Sudrajat (the military intelligence chief in East Timor) and Wiranto (the commander of the Indonesian military), the request was declined by a single judge of the Special Panels for lack of supporting evidence. The Serious Crimes Unit responded by filing supporting materials of 13,000 pages and 1,500 witness statements. The General Prosecutor publicly criticized the international judges on the Special Panels for failing to act on the arrest warrant against Wiranto, and signaled his intention to submit the warrant to Interpol. An international judge, Philip Rapoza, then issued arrest warrants for both Yayat Sudrajat and Wiranto on 10th May 2004. Longuinhos Monteiro was then summoned to the office of President Gusmao and summarily informed that such actions would harm East Timor's relationship with its powerful neighbour, Indonesia.
The view of the government of East Timor was that it could not carry such a heavy diplomatic burden on its own, and that the UN should bear this responsibility. The situation confronting the government of East Timor is understandable; in a schoolyard, a bullied child with no other allies is often forced to come to terms with its tormentor. The main task for people of goodwill, then, is to create the conditions in which a future East Timorese government can realistically call for justice.
The Commission on Truth and Friendship
In March 2005, the Indonesian authorities made another attempt to evade an international tribunal, forming a Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF) with the government of East Timor. The CTF had originally stemmed from an idea of Jose Ramos-Horta, who proposed a panel of eminent persons from Asia (i.e. not limited to Indonesia or East Timor). Indonesia responded by engineering the CTF, which had several crucial differences to the original proposal:
- It was entirely bilateral; only Indonesian and East Timorese commissioners would preside over it, meaning that there would be no opportunity for multilateral involvement.
- It would have no power to compel testimony (or even the attendance) of witnesses.
- It would have no power to compel people or institutions to produce any documentary evidence.
- It would have no institutional independence from the two states.
- It would be unable to determine individual responsibility.
- It would have the power to recommend amnesties. This was, obviously, a way of absolving those who bore greatest responsibility for the crimes.
Human rights organizations and other civil society groups in Indonesia, as well as those in East Timor, objected to this Commission. Its proceedings quickly descended into farce, with senior Indonesian leaders and officials claiming that the atrocities were everyone else's fault but their own. On one occasion, the behaviour of Indonesian co-chairman Benjamin Mangkoedilaga resulted in all East Timorese commission members remaining silent in protest.
The United Nations boycotted the CTF's proceedings altogether, saying it did not condone amnesties regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that the UN "cannot endorse or condone amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights, nor should it do anything that might foster them. Unless the terms of reference are revised to comply with international standards, officials of the United Nations will, therefore, not testify at its proceedings or take any other steps that would support the work of the CTF and thereby further the possible grant of amnesties in respect of such acts." 9
Mangkoedilaga has form; in 1999, he presided over the so-called Peace and Stability Commission, which tried to provide a fig-leaf of legitimacy and neutrality to the Indonesian military's terror campaign against the independence ballot in East Timor. Mangkoedilaga and his colleagues fled East Timor even as the staff of the United Nations were being held hostage. He left on 3rd September 1999, the day before the results of the ballot were announced, even though his Commission was supposed to monitor the situation there. Other members of the Commission left two days before he did. When asked about his performance at the time, he said, 'What could we do? We were instructed by the military authorities to leave the country' 10.
According to an insightful analysis of the CTF, it may well be in violation of the Indonesian as well as the East Timorese constitutions 11. Read it here. The former requires Indonesia's House of Representatives to approve international agreements such as the CTF, and the latter requires ratification or approval followed by publication in the official gazette. Neither occurred. It is hardly a secret, however, that the real aim of the CTF is the same as that of the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court – to absolve Indonesia's senior perpetrators of charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As Benjamin Mangkoedilaga acknowledged frankly, 'The important thing is to give trust to the invitees that our invitation will not lead to any trial or the setting up of any tribunal' 12.
In the end, the international criticism had an effect; the CTF refused to give any amnesties. It found that the Indonesian military, the Indonesian civilian government and anti-independence militias bore institutional responsibility for thousands of "gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity" including "murder, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention and forcible transfer and deportation" against the East Timorese civilian population. The CTF had no power to prosecute the perpetrators. Read it here.
The UN Commission of Experts
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Commission of Experts in January 2005 to review the justice processes in Indonesia and East Timor. This Commission reported in May 2005 that the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court was 'manifestly inadequate' and showed 'scant respect for or conformity to relevant international standards' 13. It recommended that Indonesia be given six months to try the perpetrators, failing which the Security Council adopt a resolution to create an ad hoc criminal tribunal for Timor-Leste located in a third State. Read it here.
In response to the Commission's report, the Secretary-General said in July 2006 that 'the re-establishment of the prosecutorial component' of the Serious Crimes Unit 'would not be practically feasible at the present time' but that 'the resumption of the investigative functions of SCU in order to complete the investigations into several hundred serious crimes is not only practically feasible but would also substantially allay concerns about the risk of leaving the expectations of the Timorese people unmet'. He therefore recommended the establishment of 'an experienced investigation team, led by an international serious crimes investigator, with sufficient resources to resume the investigative functions of the Serious Crimes Unit and complete investigations into outstanding serious crimes cases of 1999 in a timely fashion' 14.
1 A. Downer, Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 14 March 1999.
2 Report of the Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations, http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/KPP%20Ham%20%28e%29.htm
3 UN Doc. S/2005/458, May 26, 2005.
4 Sonia Picado was a member of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly and Vice – chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Inter- American Institute of Human Rights. Judith Sefi Attah was Minister of Women's Affairs and Social Development of Nigeria and was a member of the Sub- Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now called the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) from 1987 to 1997. A.M. Ahmadi is a former Chief Justice of India. Mari Kapi was Deputy Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea. Sabine Leutheusser – Schnarrenberger is a former Federal Minister of Justice in Germany and a member of the German Bundestag (Parliament).
5 This section relies on interviews with UN Trial Observers and NGOs monitoring the trials.
6 D. Cohen, 'Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta', International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper Series, August 2003; S. Linton, 'Unraveling the First Three Trials at Indonesia's Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights Violations in East Timor', Leiden Journal of International Law 17, 2004; 'Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in East Timor in 1999', UN Doc. S/2005/458, May 26, 2005.
7 Commission of Experts Report, p 88.
8 Resolution 1272 of 1999.
9 UN, Secretary-General says UN officials will not testify at Timor-Leste Commission, 26 July 2007. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11101.doc.htm
10 Aboeprijadi Santoso, Timor Leste 1999 or, how to sell lies, Jakarta Post, 1 May 2007.
11 M. Hirst, Too much friendship, too little truth: Monitoring Report on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, International Centre for Transitional Justice, January 2008.
12 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Apology and Truth may earn amnesty', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2007.
13 UN News Centre, Timor-Leste: UN mandated Commission calls on Indonesia to review prosecutions, 27 July 2005.
14 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste, 26 July 2006.